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Abstract
The main focus of this study is on risk communication about dangerous environmental
events in post-Katrina New Orleans, and the influence that race and class have on that
process. It seeks to determine the assessment of New Orleans residents of the various
possible sources of risk information that are available to them, and how race and
socioeconomic class affect their level of trust in those sources. A 37-question telephone
survey was conducted in Orleans Parish by the Public Policy Research Lab at Louisiana
State University in June and July of 2012. There were 414 completed surveys, with 278
landline telephone and 136 cell phone respondents. The overall margin of error was +/4.8% at a 95% confidence interval. SPSS software was used to analyze data testing four
hypotheses for each of two research questions on risk assessment: the first on race, the
second on class (socioeconomic status, or “SES”). An ANCOVA was used to test the
hypotheses of the first research question, while Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation
Coefficient Test was used to test the second. A trust index was constructed by
aggregating Likert-scales responses to questions on the elements of trust in sources, and
an SES index was constructed by aggregating education and income responses. After
controlling for SES, Whites were shown to have significantly more trust in mass media,
local community leaders and spokespersons, and interpersonal communication than
Blacks did. After controlling for race, SES was found to be negatively correlated with
trust in local TV news, non-news websites, and social media sites. Tests of correlation
were also run on frequency of media use and trust in sources of risk messages.
Keywords: Katrina, risk, race, class, trust, media
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Our society has not determined whether it is the responsibility of the
professional scientists to communicate only to their peers, or also to elected or appointed
government officials, or directly to the public.”
-Anne Branscomb, American Bar Association (Branscomb, 1981, p.6)

The Gulf Coast of the United States, and New Orleans in particular, has been
subjected to the effects of hurricanes for centuries. These storms have wreaked havoc on
the residents, many of whom have lost their lives either in the storms or their aftermath.
Weather forecasting has improved dramatically in recent years, due primarily to
technological advances in radar and satellite imagery. In addition, the accuracy of
computer models simulating the effects of natural disasters has increased. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) commissioned a hurricane simulation exercise
that was conducted in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in the summer of 2004, called “Hurricane
Pam” (FEMA, 2004), one year before Katrina made landfall.
In addition, FEMA commissioned Integrated Emergency Management, Inc.
(“IEM”), a Baton Rouge firm that specializes in “catastrophic planning and
preparedness” (Committee on Homeland Security, 2006) to prepare a “Southeast
Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Functional Plan” based on the findings of the
Hurricane Pam exercise. A draft of the report was released on August 6, 2004, more than
a year prior to Katrina (IEM, 2004).
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In her testimony before Congress on January 24, 2006, at a hearing before the
Committee on Homeland Security on the Hurricane Pam exercise, IEM CEO Madhu
Beriwal compared the statistics from the Pam exercise to those of Hurricane Katrina
(Committee on Homeland Security, 2006). They included the following data:
Table I: Data comparison: Hurricane Pam Exercise and Hurricane Katrina Actual
Hurricane Pam Exercise

Hurricane Katrina Actual

20 inches of rain

18 inches of rain

Overtopping of levees

Levees breached

Over 55,000 in public shelters prior to

Approx. 60,000 in public shelters prior to

landfall

landfall

Over 1.1 million La. residents displaced

1 million Gulf Coast residents displaced

233,986 collapsed buildings

250,000 homes destroyed

Over 60,000 deaths

1,110 deaths reported in La. to date
[final death total - 1,836
(hurricanekatrinarelief.com)]

36% evacuated prior to landfall

80-90% evacuated prior to landfall

By most measures the Hurricane Pam exercise would be considered a success,
especially in hindsight after Hurricane Katrina. The accuracy of many of the predictions
listed above would support that assertion. Yet despite the accuracy of the forecasting,
1,836 people did not survive Katrina, and the nation watched in horror as thousands
suffered for days in inhuman conditions, waiting for help that took too long to get there,
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or arrived too late to help.
This study will explore the manner in which Black and White residents of New
Orleans receive messages of risk. The purpose of this study is to examine how racial,
social, and cultural variables impact risk communication. In Popular Beliefs, Media, and
Biotechnology, Priest (1999) notes the complex environment in which scientific messages
are received:
The news stream is only one component of a much broader information
environment in which individual human beings, members of a persistent culture
and (typically) of many intersecting subcultures, selectively choose and actively
process what messages they will attend to. This information environment is made
up of marketing messages as well as objective journalism, of fictional
entertainment as well as factual news, and of material intended to educate
as well as report (p.101).

The use of models to confront environmental challenges is a long-established
tradition in the environmental sciences, and many of these models seek to incorporate
public input in the process (Creighton, 1980; Manno et al, (undated); Peterson et al; 2004;
Senecah, 2004). For the most part, these efforts see science research and science
communication as separate and sequential: first the research, then the communication.
This study is intended to make a contribution toward the embedding of mass
communication strategies in scientific models, so that from the outset of each scientific
research project that is seen to have a potential public impact, the communication profiles
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and patterns of those affected by the research will be considered, and communication
strategies will be developed in tandem with the scientific research. Drawing on the
literature of risk communication, this study seeks to contribute to the development of a
risk communication model for natural disasters that takes into account the racial, social,
economic and cultural elements of the communication environments of the target
audiences.
This study is based upon an analysis of data collected by means of a telephone
survey (both land line and cell phones) of residents of Orleans Parish in Louisiana. I
designed and wrote the survey, which was conducted by the Public Policy Research Lab
at Louisiana State University. In Chapter 2, I review the literature relevant to this study,
including an extensive exploration of risk communication theory and models, the concept
of trust, particularly in trust of the media, and the theories of Media System Dependency
(“MSD”) and Uses and Gratifications (“U&G”). In Chapter 2, I also explore the
connections among race, class, poverty, and communications, and outline the two
research questions of the study and the four hypotheses of each.
Chapter 3 offers a detailed explanation of the methods employed in the study,
particularly in the construction of the telephone survey, as well as an elucidation of my
approach to the analysis of the data. I present the results of the study in Chapter 4,
including tabular data presenting the findings of the statistical tests conducted in SPSS. In
Chapter 5, I discuss the limitations of the study, as well as its implications and
suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This study entails an exploration of the means, methods, and processes that people
of different races and economic classes, acting in different cultural and social
environments, use to access messages of risk. The four hypotheses of each of the two
research questions seek to test ways in which those means, methods, and processes might
be different. The data from this study is intended to further illuminate the process of risk
communication.

Risk Communication Theory
Since this inquiry is concerned with scientific messages associated with natural
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, the literature on risk communication theory should
help to illuminate the broader inquiry. The Committee on Risk Perception and
Communication of the National Research Council (“NRC”) offers a useful definition of
risk communication in their study, “Improving Risk Communication” (NRC, 1989):
Risk communication is an interactive process of exchange of information
and opinion among individuals, groups, and institutions. It involves multiple
messages about the nature of risk and other messages, not strictly about risk, that
express concerns, opinions, or reactions to risk messages or to legal and
institutional arrangements for risk management (p. 21).

The authors use the term “interactive process” to describe risk communication. It
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is helpful to look at the concepts it embodies. The authors explain that the first word of
the term, “interactive,” denotes a distinction between communication, which is
multidirectional, and messages, which are unidirectional. Their definition also serves to
identify the risk message as an element of a process that occurs in a large and diverse
social context. This distinction is not only relevant within the field of risk
communication, but is also applicable when risk communication is sited on the
longitudinal continuum of communication research. Beginning with the propaganda
theorists in the First World War, early researchers saw communication as a linear
process, one that was elegantly summed up by one of those researchers, Harold Lasswell
(1949), as “Who says what to whom through what medium with what effect.” The linear
model held sway through two World Wars, and was the dominant model when
researchers studied the formation of voter opinion (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet,
1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee, 1954; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). While expecting
to find direct effects of communication messages transmitted by powerful media to a
susceptible public in accordance with the linear model, the researchers discovered the
important role that opinion leaders played in the formation of public opinion. Rather than
following a straight line from active message creator to passive message recipient, they
found that the transmission of messages is a process in which the message is received by
individual message recipients, some of whom, by virtue of their position in the
community, are considered influential. These “opinion leaders” process the message in
accordance with their own values and attitudes, and then, through interpersonal
communication, share the message, transformed by those values and attitudes, with other
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members of the community. Perhaps most importantly, Katz and Lazarsfeld recognized
that the communication process occurred within interpersonal networks that were shaped
by a “social reality” unique to the specific community in which it occurs. In their
discussion of how this social reality affects message reception and the formation of
opinion, they cite Festinger, Schachter and Back (1950), who argue that, “The ‘reality’
which settles the question in the case of social attitudes and opinions is the degree to
which others with whom one is in communication are believed to share these opinions
and attitudes.” The linear model of direct effects began to give way to that of contingent
effects, and graphic diagrams of the communication process changed from unidirectional
to multidirectional.
The NRC authors note that public agencies have recognized the importance of
community opinion leaders in risk communication, even, in some cases, relying on those
leaders for risk message dissemination. Citing Stern and Aronson (1984), they argue that
“public agencies can sometimes be more effective in delivering technical information to
individual citizens by using trusted sources as intermediaries than by designing and
disseminating messages themselves” (NRC, 1989, p. 25). Consistent with their view of
risk communication as a multidirectional process, they note that these community opinion
leaders, functioning in the role of “trusted intermediaries” in the risk communication
process, can offer valuable input to public officials regarding the most effective methods
to disseminate risk messages in their communities.
The NRC authors use the second word of the term “interactive process” to
describe the complexity and scope of risk communication, which “includes all messages
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and interactions that bear on risk decisions” (p. 22). They note that not only does risk
communication include the traditional “announcements, warnings, and instructions
moving from expert sources to non-expert audiences,” but also includes many other kinds
of messages that include “personal beliefs and feelings concerning risks and hazards,
about reactions to risk management actions and institutions” (p. 22). Their recognition of
the importance of viewing risk communication as a dynamic process that operates in a
social environment is summarized in the following statement:
Our use of the term risk communication also pays explicit attention to the social
interaction and debate that are essential to democratic political choice and that
often contribute to personal decisions about hazardous activities. Risk
communication includes messages moving in various directions – not only from
experts to nonexperts but also from nonexperts to each other, from nonexperts
to experts, and especially the messages of political participation, from citizens
to public decision makers. Decisions in government depend on dialogue between
the decision maker and staff within the responsible agency and between the
decision maker and various political participants, who influence the decision
maker’s view of the risks and the risk management options (p. 22).

Who are the key actors in this process? In addition to the community opinion
leaders described above, the NRC authors include experts in governmental agencies, their
staff members, mass media, interpersonal channels, community organizations, and
members of the community. Covello, von Winterfeldt, and Slovic (1986) offer a
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definition of risk communication that is complementary to that of the NRC, and provides
further detail on the risk communication process and the actors who participate in it:
Risk communication is the act of conveying or transmitting information between
parties about (a) levels of health or environmental risks; (b) the significance or
meaning of health or environmental risks; or (c) decisions, actions, or policies
aimed at managing or controlling health or environmental risks. Interested parties
include government, agencies, corporations, and industry groups, unions, the
media, scientists, professional organizations, public interest groups, and
individual citizens (p. 172).

The NRC (1989) offers an additional level of detail to the analysis of the process,
giving examples of various pathways of communication: interpersonal: doctor to patient,
friend to friend, within family; within groups: workplace, classrooms; within community:
libraries, malls, fairs, local government; and mass media (p. 140). They argue that
scientists and risk managers must be aware when constructing risk messages for
distribution to the mass media that journalists often struggle with framing the technical
and social dimensions of risk (p. 4).
The NRC authors suggest that community organizations can be used to “reinforce
and expand upon media messages,” and note that this communication avenue “can
require less time than reliance on interpersonal channels” (p. 140). In another NRC
report on energy use (NRC, 1984), the NRC notes that although using organizations as
intermediaries in the communication process is often helpful, it is important to recognize
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that these organizations have their own interests, which they may view as being helped or
harmed by the message, and therefore may either promote or interfere with the message
when they transmit it (NRC, 1984, p. 128).
When describing the members of the community who are the targeted recipients
of risk messages, the NRC authors emphasize the diversity of the audience and the
challenges of reaching them, warning that “the public is not homogeneous” (p. 4), that
“the people who need information most seem to be the least likely to pay attention” (p.
136), and that “different people rely on different information channels” (p. 137). Key
assumptions of the NRC view of risk communication include:
a) The effectiveness of risk messages is dependent in large part upon recognition
by the message creator of the characteristics (attributes) of the intended audience. These
attributes include “cultural background, shared interests, concerns and fears, social
attitudes, and…facility with language”
b) Each medium of communication (interpersonal, direct mail, advertising,
broadcast, print, etc.) has advantages and limitations that must be recognized by the
message creator;
c) source credibility is key to effective (successful) risk messages;
d) where widespread mistrust of public sources of information exists, message
creators should utilize opinion leaders in the community as both transmitters of and
sources for risk information (pp. 24-25).

The authors caution against the tendency to evaluate the success of risk
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communication from the point of view of the sender in “getting the message across” (p.
20). They argue that this perspective encourages an unacceptable perspective on risk
communication: “the image is of experts enlightening or persuading an uninformed and
passive public” (p. 20). This top-down view of risk communication is inconsistent with
the dynamic model that they present in their study. They see risk communication as part
of risk management, the key to which is the “selection of risk control options” (p. 21).
They argue that it is “the process that provides the information on which government,
industry or individual decision makers [emphasis mine] base their choices” (p. 21). When
a community is facing a natural disaster of the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina, as New
Orleans was in August of 2005, the effectiveness of this risk communication process can
be a matter of life and death. Guion, Scammon and Borders (2007) note that in risk
communication in natural disasters, prior experience with a similar disaster, source
credibility, and the personal relevance of the risk are all factors that come into play in
message processing (p. 27). In a study of flood warning messages in a small Texas town,
Perry and Mushkatel (1984) found that source credibility was nearly twice as important
in personal risk assessment among Blacks than among Whites (p. 72). In ranking of
credibility of sources by confidence expressed in each, Blacks rated police or firefighters
first, neighbors or friends second, and personal judgment third. Whites ranked mass
media (radio and television) first, police or firefighters second, and personal judgment
third (p. 74).
The concept of source credibility is a key element in risk communication. The
NRC (1989) argues that the recipients’ opinion of the degree of expertise of the source
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and the degree of trust they have in that source influence they way they process risk
messages. Citing McGuire (1985), the authors offer a useful definition: “The term
‘credibility’ is used by researchers in this field to refer to an attribute of a source that
derives from a combination of expertise and trust, as seen by the audience” (p. 24). They
note that different sources are seen as credible on some issues, but not on others.
Renn and Levine (1991) connect the concepts of source credibility and trust:
“Trust in communication refers to the generalized expectancy that a message received is
true and reliable and that the communicator demonstrates competence and honesty by
conveying accurate, objective, and complete information” (p. 179). The authors also draw
a distinction between trust and confidence. They note that although the two terms are
often used interchangeably, “confidence in a source can be distinguished from trust as a
more enduring experience of trustworthiness over time” (p. 179). They argue that trust is
a “prerequisite for social orientation,” and that a minimum level of trust must exist
between the actors involved in the communication, “at least to the point that they share a
common meaning of the elements of the communication process” (p. 184).
Communications researchers working since the publication of the NRC study
have concentrated on the role that social environment and culture play in the
communication process. Renn (1992) notes that “anthropologists and cultural sociologists
have suggested that social responses to risks are determined by prototypes of cultural
belief patterns, that is, clusters of related convictions and perceptions of reality” (pp. 7273). Rayner (1992) offers a cultural theorist’s perspective that sees risk communication as
a process occurring within the social organizations in which it is received: “Cultural
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theory argues that risks are defined, perceived, and managed according to principles that
inhere in particular forms of social organization”
(p. 84). Consistent with the view of the NRC authors, he rejects the linear communication
model, arguing that, “the dominant model of risk communication essentially is one of
information transmission with the goal of educating the recipient … But information
transmission is only one part of communication, which also involves developing shared
meaning among individuals, institutions, and communities and establishing relationships
of trust” (p. 85). Using Lasswell’s (1949), “Who says what in which channel to whom
with what effect” as a template, he argues that the primary concern of risk
communication is “how to pass quantitative information about the probabilities of and
consequences of events from one information bearer (the transmitter) to another (the
receiver) through a medium (the channel) with the minimum of distortion” (Rayner,
1992, p. 85).
The common thread that runs through these studies of risk communication is the
vital role the individual message recipient plays in the process. Without a message
recipient, the risk message becomes the proverbial one hand clapping. Potter (2009)
emphasizes the effect of individuality on message reception:
Each audience member brings to the exposure situation a complex array of
personal experiences and needs; this complexity substantially shapes the meaning
construction process. Thus, the meaning that the sender thinks he or she has built
into the message is not always the meaning that is received by audience members
(p. 22).
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Krimsky (1992) places the individual recipient of risk messages in a social
context, arguing that, “The choice people make about risks is settled by the choices they
make in the kinds of social institutions with which they associate” (p. 20). Kasperson
(1992) argues that risk message processing occurs in a context unique to each cultural or
social group, one in which each group selects certain risks as worthy of concern while
deselecting others as unworthy. Within each group, individuals or groups of individuals
collect information about risk, and when transmitting information about those risks that
are selected as worthy of concern, they act as “amplification stations,” while those risks
deemed unworthy of attention will be de-emphasized or ignored, resulting in what is
termed “risk attenuation” (pp. 160-161).
Kasperson (1992) sees culture as a “super-variable that shapes characteristics of
all stages, components, and processes in the framework, and even the risk or risk event
itself”
(p. 163). Entman (1993) defines culture in terms of frames: “The culture is the stock of
commonly invoked frames; in fact, culture might be defined as the empirically
demonstrable set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most
people in a social grouping” (p. 53). Kasperson (1992) attempts to quantify the influence
of cultural factors on (and in) the risk communication process through the introduction of
a concept that he terms “the social amplification of risk framework”: “The concept of
social amplification of risk is based on the thesis that events pertaining to hazards interact
with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural processes in ways that can heighten
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or attenuate perceptions of risk and shape behavior” (pp. 157-158). Kasperson et al.
(1988) note the function of elements of message content on reception, including factual
(type of risk, source of message), inferential (conclusions that can be drawn), and
symbolic, e.g., cultural referents, such as “big business” or “high technology”
(p. 180). They argue that this symbolic content is an important factor in gaining audience
attention, and it also affects the decoding process.
In his study of media coverage of oil spills, Leschine (2001) found that messages
are amplified when they resonate in a socio-cultural atmosphere consistent with the
message frame (“social amplification”) and attenuated in one inconsistent with that
message frame (“social attenuation”). Kasperson’s concept of people as “amplification
stations” (Kasperson, 1992,
p. 159) is a direct corollary to the “opinion leaders” of Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955):
The individuals or groups who collect information about risks communicate with
others, and through behavioral responses act, in our terminology, as amplification
stations. Amplification stations can be individuals, groups, or institutions. It is
obvious that social groups and institutions do not act or react merely in their roles
as private persons, but rather according to the specification associated with their
positions. Amplification my therefore differ among individuals in their roles as
private citizens and in their roles as employees or members of social groups and
organizations (p. 159).

Kasperson (1992) notes that the effects (harms) associated with a risk event are
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both direct and social, such as “the social processing of those events, social
stigmatization, group conflict, loss of community and social disruption” (p.161). Renn
(1992) offers what he calls the Arena Metaphor, “to describe the symbolic location of
political actions that influence collective decisions or policies” (p. 181). He chooses the
term “arena” because he sees risk communication as a struggle, one in which social
groups with different messages compete in a political arena in an effort to mobilize social
resources to act in a manner consistent with their goals. In Renn’s model, the outcome of
the struggle is determined not only by the actions of individuals or groups, but also by the
structure of the arena itself, and the interaction of the competing groups within it. He is
careful to say that these arenas are “neither geographical entities nor organizational
systems, but rather, “describe the political actions of all social actors in involved in a
specific issue” (p. 181). Kasperson compares the risk communication process to a rock
thrown into a pond, creating ripple effects that reach beyond the initial meeting of stone
and water.
In a comprehensive analysis of risk communication and the social amplification
and attenuation of risk messages, Renn (1991) emphasizes the effect that social context
has on risk messages: “The main thesis of the social amplification concept is that events
pertaining to hazards interact with psychological, social, and cultural processes in ways
that can heighten or attenuate public perceptions of risk and shape risk behavior” (p.
287). Rayner (1992) emphasizes the social context of risk communication: “But
information transmission is only one part of communication, which also involves
developing shared meaning among individuals, institutions, and communities and
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establishing relationships of trust” (p. 85). He sites risk communication in a social
context of shared meaning, in which trust is a key element in its effectiveness. It is
relevant to this inquiry into risk communication in post-Katrina New Orleans to explore
the concept of trust in some detail.

Trust
In an experiment by the Yale Communication Research Program that studied
audience reactions to identical messages received from sources viewed as either
trustworthy or untrustworthy, Hovland and Weiss (1951) found that “changes in opinion
are significantly related to the trustworthiness of the source used in the communication”
(p. 647). Earle and Cvetkovich (1995) argue that traditional interpretations of social trust,
such as those of Hovland and his colleagues at Yale, view trust within the boundaries of
interpersonal communication, and fail to take into consideration the influence of the
culture in which that communication takes place:
People do vary in the values they consider most important when dealing with
other personas and institutions. And this diversity of values, as well as changing
social contexts, may provide varying, perhaps conflicting, bases for judgments
of social trust (p. 29).
They further argue that a basic function of social trust is to reduce cognitive
complexity. This observation is supported by the findings of researchers working in risk
communication models based on psychological processing, such as the Elaboration
Likely Model (ELM) and Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM), which are discussed in
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some detail later in this section.
Kasperson, Golding, and Tuler (1992) personalize and individualize the concept
of social trust: “We define social trust as a person’s expectation that other persons and
institutions in a social relationship can be relied upon to act in ways that are competent,
predictable, and caring” (p. 36). Siegrist, Cvetkovich, and Roth (2000) define social trust
in the context of risk analysis: “Social trust is the willingness to rely on those who have
the responsibility for making decisions and taking actions related to the management of
technology, the environment, medicine, or other realms of public health and safety” (p.
354).
Newton (2001) argues that social trust is based on the individual’s belief that, at
the least, the group will not harm him/her, and, in the best of circumstances, it will act in
his/her interests. In this view, social trust is a primary component of social capital, one
that cements social bonds that make collective behavior both possible and productive (p.
202). Putnam (1995) defines social capital as the “features of social organization, such as
networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual
benefit” (p. 66). Bradbury, Branch, and Focht (1999) draw the distinction “between
system, or macro-level trust, and trust based on interpersonal, micro-level relationships”
(p. 120). Earle and Cvetkovich (1999) argue that social trust should be moved beyond the
rationalist tradition and sited within the narratives of the culture: “Social trust is a social
construction that is based on varying sets of cultural values – the values of specific
persons and institutions living in certain times and places – as expressed in cultural
narratives” (p. 10). In what they term a cultural values interpretation, the authors argue

19

that “social trust is based on values similarity: people tend to trust other people and
institutions that ‘tell stories’ expressing currently salient values, stories that interpret the
world in the same way they do” (p. 11). They note that “social trust tends to be a withingroup phenomenon. Individuals are inclined to trust within group boundaries and to
distrust outside them” (p. 21). `Fessenden-Raden, Fitchen, and Heath (1987) argue that,
“In spite of differences in individual experiences and perceptions within a community,
collective interpretations of the risk may develop and will often override individual
experiences” (p. 97). They site risk communication in the cultural and social context in
which it occurs:
People’s reception of the risk information is partially shaped by their perceptions
of the responses of people around them. Although ultimately the receivers of the
risk information are individuals, each person is embedded in a social surround
that shapes his or her individual reception of the information (p. 95).

As described by these researchers, social trust appears not to be a static concept,
but rather fluid and dynamic, formed by the relationship between values held by the
individual, the relationship of the individual to a group or group, and the perceptions of
both the individual and the group(s) of institutions and organizations involved in the risk
management process. Earle and Cvetkovich (1999) break social trust into two categories:
pluralistic and cosmopolitan. They see pluralistic social trust as more static, “rooted in
the pasts of existing groups” (p. 21). By contrast, they see cosmopolitan social trust as
“multiple, created in the emergence of new combinations of persons and groups” (p. 21).
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They argue that cosmopolitan trust is more useful in risk management, because the new
social combinations “are based on new sets of values that are constructed for the solution
of specific problems” (p. 21). They envision successful risk management programs in the
future “based in part on encouraging people to move toward more cosmopolitan forms of
social trust” (p. 21). This may be more easily accomplished in communities that are
themselves in flux, as is the case with many urban areas in the U.S. But in cities like New
Orleans, with at-risk neighborhoods that have changed little in demographic makeup over
many generations, it would appear that overcoming the pluralistic social trust might be
difficult. In fact, it might even suggest that risk management program designed with the
specific values of that pluralistic social trust might be more effective than one designed to
encourage members of that community to move toward a more cosmopolitan perspective.
Earle and Cvetkovich (1995) note that people make “judgments of social trust … to
manage uncertain environments by enlisting the help of others” (p. 120).
Earle and Cvetkovich (1999) designed a survey experiment to test their” cultural
values interpretation of social trust,” i.e., “social trust is based on value similarity: people
tend to trust other people and institutions that ‘tell stories’ expressing currently salient
values, stories that interpret the world in the same way they do” (p. 11). The survey tested
correlations between the value structures of the respondents and their perceptions of the
value structures of organizations and institutions described in newspaper-style stories that
they read, for which they were asked to rate their level of trust. They found that the
“cultural matches between respondents and stories produced the highest judgements of
social trust and trust values for all groups of respondents” (p.14).
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If these researchers are correct, and individuals trust sources found within their
group boundaries for information on risk, it raises the question of whom within those
boundaries they trust for that information. In their explication of the model of two-step
flow of communication, first published in 1955, Katz and Lazarsfeld (2006) outline the
role of opinion leaders in the community in influencing public opinion. Although the
basic description of their model posits a rather passive audience influenced by active
leaders, a view that has been largely abandoned in more recent research, they make an
important observation on the role of opinion leaders in the communication process:
Opinion leaders are not a group set apart, and … opinion leadership is not a trait
which some people have and others do not, but rather that opinion leadership is an
integral part of the give-and-take of everyday personal relationships. It is being
suggested, in other words, that all interpersonal relations are potential networks of
communication and that an opinion leader can best be thought of as a group
member playing a key communications role (p. 33).

Earle and Cvetkovich posit a dynamic communications environment that exists
within a community, one in which the role of “opinion leader” is fluid, shifting from
person to person within interpersonal communications. This finding is supported in the
related voting study of Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee (1954), in which they argue
(with an interesting simile), that “in practice there must be unending circuits of leadership
relationships running through the community, like a nerve system through the body” (p.
110). Bandura (1994) puts it succinctly: “There is no single social network in a
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community that serves all purposes” (p. 84). Although investigating different aspects of
communities and the interpersonal communications that occur within them, there is a
common thread among the inquiries of these researchers: they see “community” as a
complex organization of people with different interests, who interact with each other
through interpersonal communication with a frequency and intensity that varies with the
issue at hand.
In a study of trust analyzed in the larger context of social capital, Uslaner (2004)
conducted a meta-analysis of national survey data of states from studies spanning the last
two decades of the 20th Century. He explored the concept of “generalized trust,” which he
defines as “a moral value that connects people to others who may be different than
themselves” (p. 501). He found that those states with higher overall levels of generalized
trust, regardless of race, had higher levels of trust and participation in government by
Blacks and other minorities. One of the variables that Uslaner used as an indicator of
social trust was the suspension ratio of black to white students. Louisiana had the fifthhighest ratio, behind only Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina, while
having the third –lowest index of generalized trust, behind only Alabama and Mississippi.
In his longitudinal study of national public opinion surveys conducted in 1965, 1975, and
1985, Putnam (1996) found a downturn in joining and trusting that led to an erosion of
social capital that was greater among Blacks than Whites (p. 42). Putnam names an
unusual “culprit” in this decline: television. He identifies a correlation between the
increase of percentage of homes with televisions, the increase in average hours per day
watching television, and the decrease in social relations, resulting in a decrease in social
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engagement. In a longitudinal study of trust in government during the period 1964-1970,
Miller (1974) discovered an interesting phenomenon: “Blacks demonstrated more trust in
government than whites prior to 1968, with a sharp divergence and reversal occurring
between the races after 1968” (p. 954). Miller places his findings in the context of
political events at the time, pointing out the landmark passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 as an event that stirred the trust of Blacks in government, and, in the obverse, may
have created resentment among Whites for what they viewed as favoritism toward a
minority. Certainly, it could be argued that the assasinations of two champions of civil
rights, Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy, within two months of each other in
1968 had a chilling effect on the hopes of Blacks that the government would continue to
move forward in protecting and expanding their civil rights. Miller notes that the election
of Richard Nixon in 1968, returning the White House to Republican control for the first
time in eight years, also had a dampening effect on the trust of Blacks in government. In
a study similar to that of Miller, conducted on data collected in 1996 (during the Clinton
presidency), Hetherington (1998) found that after controlling for the preference of Blacks
for a Democratic administration, Blacks showed significantly less trust in government
than did Whites. This decrease in trust is understandable when viewed in the context of
national presidential political campaigns beginning with Nixon in 1968, when Blacks
were routinely demonized in Republican advertising as rioters (Nixon), welfare cheats
(Reagan) and criminals (George H.W. Bush). During the 30-year period from 1968 to
1998, when Hetherington did his study, there were 20 years of Republican presidents
(Nixon, Ford, Reagan, George H.W. Bush) and 12 years of Democrats (Carter and
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Clinton). The gains of the Civil Rights era under Lyndon Baines Johnson had receded
from the collective memory by the end of the 20th Century.
In their study of energy emergencies, the National Research Council (NRC, 1984)
found what they termed a “dilemma” when it comes to trust in messages from the
government, one that appears to be particularly relevant to the natural disaster scenarios
such as that of Hurricane Katrina: “The more trust in government is needed, the less
likely it is to exist. Trust is most important when people are least prepared for an
emergency, but people’s confidence in government may well be shaken if they are not
adequately prepared” (p. 149).
Where local government is preferred, messages from state and national
government are viewed as less “true” (Fessenden-Raden et al., 1987, p. 96). The
communal influence on message reception can develop into a “collective interpretation”
of risk, which may “override individual experiences” (p. 97). This collective
interpretation of risk is often extended to science, where risk messages embedded in
scientific narratives compete for acceptance with local narratives of scientific activities
(Earle and Cvetkovich, 1995, p. 141). Earle and Cvetkovich argue that the narrative
norms of science are being continually – and “locally” – reconstructed within the
scientific community within contexts peculiar to the scientific community, which may, in
fact, may them increasingly more remote, less relevant, and even in conflict with the
local narratives of scientific activities in the communities where those narratives are
received (pp. 140-141).
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Greenberg & Williams (1999) found that personal feelings of threat in the
community, e.g., fear of personal attacks at night, are transferred to distrust of local
officials. Following Perry and Mushkatel (1984), Guion, Scammon, and Borders (2007)
argue that in risk communication, Blacks have the highest degree of confidence when the
messages are received directly from local authorities, while Whites trusted the mass
media, and Mexican Americans had the greatest trust in risk messages that came from
their family and friends. Cole and Fellows (2008) note that public officials for the most
part ignored interpersonal networks for distribution of risk and evacuation messages,
relying instead on official government spokespersons to deliver the messages.
In their book, “Participation in America,” Verba and Nie (1972) took a
comprehensive look at community structure and its influence on concurrence between
citizens and leaders, using variables including race and levels of participation. They did
not find a linear correlation between level of participation (activism) and concurrence
between officials and the citizenry. Where they found a high level of citizen participation,
leaders were responsive to the citizens; where participation was low, leaders tended to
respond more to the active participants than to the “quiescent” citizens (p. 314). These
findings are consistent with those of Putnam’s longitudinal study of trust, noted above.
The high level of citizen participation noted by Verba and Nie is indicative of a high level
of social capital, which is generated through participation. In the obverse, where social
participation is low, so is trust and social capital, so public officials must seek out
community leaders and opinion makers in order to effectuate their policies.
Most of the significant research in the field of trust has occurred 1985, when
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Burns W. Roper conducted a survey-based study for the Television Information Office
entitled, “Public Attitudes Toward Television and Other Media in a Time of Change”
(Roper, 1985). Out of that seminal study emerged the “Roper Question,” which became a
staple in surveys on media credibility. The Roper Question asks, “If you got conflicting
or different reports of the same news story from radio, television, the magazines and the
newspapers, which of the four versions would you be most inclined to believe – the one
on radio or television or magazines or newspapers?” Studies following Roper looked for
valid and reliable methods to measure source credibility. Following Roper (1985) and
Gaziano and McGrath (1986), Meyer (1988) sought to develop an effective measurement
index of source credibility for newspapers. Meyer found that a five-item index distilled
from the Gaziano and McGrath data was both reliable and valid. He presents an elegantly
simple index, measuring five aspects of source credibility on a semantic differential
scale:
1) fair/unfair
2) unbiased/biased
3) tells the whole story/doesn’t tell the whole story
4) accurate/inaccurate
5) can be trusted/can’t be trusted
Following Roper (1985), Gaziano and McGrath (1986), and Meyer (1988),
McComas and Trumbo (2001) conducted research designed to test “the usefulness of
Meyer’s credibility index in the context of risk communication” (ibid., p. 476). They
sought “to determine whether the indices perform consistently across several
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environmental risk communication contexts” (ibid., p. 471). In order to do so, they
adopted Meyer’s five-item believability index to measure the credibility of the
institutions that they were studying. Their findings supported those of Meyer some 13
years earlier:
The results of the reliability analysis demonstrated that the source credibility
indices produced good internal consistency, showing an average Cronbach’s
alpha of 0.84. Moreover, the index’s reliability was evident across the three
sources, as well as across the five cases (p. 476).

In a subsequent study of the function of credibility in the processing of risk
messages concerning cancer clusters, Trumbo and McComas (2003) used a five-point
semantic differential (Likert) scale for the answers, with low values indicating lower
levels of credibility, and high values indicating higher levels. They found that “source
credibility indices all present fairly strong direct paths to risk perception” (ibid., p. 349).
In a finding particularly relevant to this study, they discovered that “perceiving greater
credibility for the state health departments and industries suppresses risk perceptions,
whereas perceiving greater credibility for the citizens’ groups associates with perceptions
of greater risk” (ibid, p. 349). However, they note that, “the credibility indices perform
less robustly in their prediction of information processing” (ibid.,
p. 349), which can be viewed as an indication of the difficulty in attempting to quantify
value-laden concepts, e.g., credibility and trust, as expressed in attitudes or beliefs, to the
psychological processes that underlie them. McComas and Trumbo also found significant
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variation in the mean values of the index depending on the source and context, serving to
highlight differences in source credibility across the cases studied (ibid., p. 476).
In his study of suspected environmental cancer clusters in the U.S., Trumbo
(2008) explored the ways in which institutional trust affects risk messages processing. He
argues that “individuals base their trust of an institution on an assessment of the degree to
which the institution shares the individual’s values” (p. 3). Using a term coined by Earle
and Cvetkovich (1995), he calls this a Salient Value Similarity, which he argues is
“predictive of single-item measurements of trust” (p. 3), i.e., that the correlation between
the values of the institution and those of the individual can be statistically measured.
Trumbo conducted his study on risk perception of individuals who lived in communities
where there was a public perception that an environmental hazard existed that was
leading to an increase in the local cancer rate. The results confirmed the existence of a
Salient Value Similarity: “[Individuals] reporting greater trust for the state health
departments suppresses risk perceptions, while [individuals] reporting greater trust for the
civic groups associates with perceptions of greater risk” (p. 13). The results show that
when processing of risk messages takes the more complex pathway of systematic
processing, the individual’s assessment of the level of potential harm from that risk is
reduced. But when the processing of risk messages takes the faster and more simplistic
pathway of heuristic processing, the individual’s assessment of the level of potential
harm from that risk is increased. Cvetkovich and Lofstedt (1999) argue that while “social
trust reduces demands on the individual by reducing the cognitive complexity of
decisions,” there can also be “ugly” results that arise “from group members trusting those
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who are insensitive to the requirements of the environment in which the group operates”
(p. 156). They cite the occurrence of “group think,” in which “trust in a leader may put
into play psychological and social processes that isolate the group. Assured of its
specialness and correctness, the group may be led to take ultimately disastrous actions”
(p. 156).
Trumbo and McComas (2008) applied Meyer’s credibility index within the HSM
model of Eagly and Chaiken to assess the credibility of sources such as the New York
State Department of Health and citizens’ groups for risk information on cancer clusters,
using the following question: “Considering what you know, please circle the number
between the pair of words that best describes your feelings about information from the
New York State Department of Health” (ibid., p. 67). Answers to Meyer’s five-point
index (noted above) were selected from a five-point Likert scale, numbered 1-5 on a
continuum bounded by the polar opposite answers, e.g., can be trusted/can’t be trusted.
Their findings were consistent with those of their 2003 study noted above:
The trust measures for the state health departments and the civic groups both
present significant direct paths to risk perception and reflect the opposing
valences characteristics of the information processing modes: reporting greater
trust for the state health departments suppresses risk perceptions, while reporting
greater trust for the civic groups associates with perceptions of greater risk
(p. 70).

A research study on community-wide education on cardiovascular disease
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conducted by Stanford University scientists, known as the “Stanford Five-City Project”
(Farquhar, 1990) has implications for this study of the communication of risk messages to
ethnically diverse populations such as that of New Orleans. The results of their study
showed the benefits of a communications campaign that recognizes the individuality and
complexities of the target communities: “This health education program used social
learning theory, a communication-behavior change model, community organization
principles, and social marketing methods” to achieve its desired results (p. 365).
Although the subject of the risk messaging campaign in the Stanford Five-City
Project was health, as compared to personal safety in the case of Hurricane Katrina, both
the foundation of the campaign and the choice of method of message dissemination are
relevant. Recognizing that personal behavior patterns are often ingrained and entrenched,
the message pattern was distributed over some 30 – 64 months in the target markets. The
Stanford scientists utilized a variety of media, including television, radio, newspapers,
other mass-distributed print media, and direct education (including face-to-face and
mediated education in classes, contests, and correspondence courses), to spread their
message of the benefits of heart-healthy behavior
(p. 360). The project also recognized the importance of messages designed for a diverse
audience, and utilized Spanish-language outlets and materials to reach that population.
The project developed specific messages geared to school-age children, and coordinated
distribution of those messages with teachers and administrators in the community school
districts. It was a comprehensive communication strategy that employed a wide variety of
methods and media over an extended period of time in an attempt to reach a diverse
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audience. The campaign achieved significant results in its target areas: net decreases in
cholesterol and blood pressure in the target audiences (p. 363). The lessons of the
Stanford Project can be beneficial in informing the design of safety messaging campaigns
such as those relating to hurricane preparedness and response. Considered together with
the literature reviewed above, it would seem that a risk communication program for
future natural disasters similar to Hurricane Katrina should incorporate in its formation
the recognition of these factors influencing audience reception.

Risk Communication Models
The origins of modern risk communication models can be traced back to two
health communication models that were developed in the early 1950s: the Fear Appeal
Model and the Health Belief Model. The Fear Appeal Model was developed by
researchers who studied health campaigns in the early 1950s, such as Janis and Feshbach
(1953), who studied the effectiveness of a fear-based dental hygiene program for high
school students. Out of these studies the fear-as-acquired drive model emerged, based in
learning theory and behavioral psychology. It postulated that fear was a powerful
negative drive, and that if risk messages created fear in the message recipient, he/she
would be motivated to rid him/herself of the fear, and would likely be receptive to the
prescriptive behavior advocated in the message, which would then become learned
behavior that would be activated whenever the individual was faced with a similar threat
(Witte, Meyer, & Martell, 2001). The model presents a curvilinear relationship between
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fear and behavior change, one in which there exists an optimal (and moderate) amount of
fear that produces the greatest behavior change. Too little fear produces insufficient
motivation for behavior change, and too much fear leads to rejection of the fear appeal
message (p. 13) – something of a Goldilocks and the porridge view of fear messaging.
Witte et al. (2001) use the example of a flu vaccination campaign that starts with
fear-based messages on the negative effects of flu, and then offers a prescriptive solution
- a $5 flu shot. The message recipient is made fearful, and then seeks the prescribed
remedy, not just one time, but each time in the future when he/she seeks to rid
him/herself of the fear of the flu (p. 12). The authors report that the fear-as-acquired-drive
model fell out of favor in the 1960s, as further studies showed that attitude or behavior
change were positively correlated with increased levels of fear (p. 13), results which
contradicted the arguments of Janis et al that too much fear caused the message to be
rejected. As Witte et al. (2001) state, “You could have high levels of fear and high levels
of attitude and behavior change” (p. 13).
Like the Fear Appeal Model, the Health Belief Model also emerged in the 1950s,
developed by social psychologists at the U.S. Public Health Service to try to understand
public resistance to disease prevention measures such as early screenings (Rosenstock,
1974). The model depends upon two main variables (Janz & Becker, 1984): “1) the value
placed by an individual on a particular goal, and 2) the individual’s estimate of the
likelihood that a given action will achieve that goal” (p. 2). The model is built on four
different perceptions by the message receiver: 1) susceptibility – a subjective perception
of risk; 2) severity – including personal and social consequences; 3) benefits – the
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recommended action must be perceived as “feasible and efficacious”; and 4) barriers –
the individual must perceive the barriers to performing the recommended action as not
being insurmountable (Janz & Becker, 1984).
Leventhal et al (1983) report that the development of the Dual Process Model
(commonly called the Parallel Process Model) rose out of a desire to integrate “the
directive and intensive models such as the Health Belief Model and the Fear Drive
Model” (p. 9). They argue that the Dual/Parallel Process Model is focused on the risk
message receiver, while the Health Belief Model is focused on the message creator. They
postulate two pathways for message processing: objective cognitive and subjective
emotional. The two pathways are seen as sometimes functioning independently, while at
other times “they interact in ways that are either mutually interfering or mutually
facilitating” (p. 10).
Two significant risk communication theories with similar origins were developed
during this same period – the Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) and
the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1985). It is worthwhile to read Ajzen’s
description of these theories:
The Theory of Planned Behavior stipulates that when confronted with the need to
decide on a course of action, people consider the likely consequences of available
alternatives; they weigh the normative expectations of important reference
individuals or groups; and they consider required resources and potential
impediments or obstacles. These considerations or beliefs result, respectively,
in the formation of attitudes toward the behavior of interest, subjective norms
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with respect to the behavior, and perceived behavioral control. Expectancy-value
formulations are used to describe the ways in which salient beliefs combine to
produce the more general constructs. It is assumed that people form behavioral
intentions based on their attitudes, subjective norms, and perceptions of
behavioral control, and that these intentions, together with behavioral control, are
the immediate determinants of behavior. The theory of reasoned action can be
viewed as a special case of the theory of planned behavior, applicable to situations
in which behavioral control is high and can thus be disregarded (p. 387).

Ajzen (1991) defines “subjective norms” as “the perceived social pressure to
perform or not to perform the behavior” (p. 188). By its structure, Ajzen’s model implies
that attitudes can be changed through exposure to messages that effectively change
underlying beliefs (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). Azjen (1991) draws a distinction between
subjective norms and normative beliefs, which, he argues, “are concerned with the
likelihood that important referent individuals or groups approve or disapprove of
performing a given behavior” (p. 195). In their examination of Ajzen’s Theory of
Reasoned Action, Eagly and Chaiken (1993) blur that distinction, arguing that, “In this
model, subjective norm is itself a function of normative beliefs, which represent
perceptions of significant others’ preferences about whether one should engage in a
behavior”
(p. 171). An important feature of Azjen’s model is that it allows for the quantification of
attitudes and norms, which can then be manipulated in probability formulas. Eagly and
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Chaiken (1993) acknowledge this distinction in their analysis of Fishbein and Ajzen’s
(1975) Theory of Reasoned Action, stating:
They divided the determinants of behavior into two classes – attitude toward the
behavior and subjective norm. Attitude toward the behavior, because it reflects
the information one possesses about the consequences of one’s behavior, can be
seen as an informational determinant of action, whereas subjective norm, because
it reflects others’ wishes about one should do, can be seen as a normative
determinant of action (p. 632).

Azjen’s argument is supported and expanded in subsequent risk communication
research, such as that of Griffin, Neuwirth, Dunwoody, and Giese (2004) in social norms.
The authors explore “informational subjective norms,” which they define as “one’s
perceptions of normative pressures to perform communication behaviors (e.g., to seek
and process risk-related information to keep abreast of how to cope with the risk)” (p.
30). Their study found that race plays a significant role in the processing of risk
information: “Being a member of a minority group does seem to set in motion both the
informational subjective norm and worry responses that as a byproduct lead to a greater
sense of information insufficiency among minorities” (p. 50).
The last two decades of the 20th Century saw the development of two theoretical
models with relevance to Risk Communication Theory: The Elaboration Likelihood
Model (“ELM”) advanced by Petty and Cacioppo (1986), and the Heuristic-Systematic
Model (“HSM”) advanced by Eagly and Chaiken (1993). Like the ELM which preceded
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it, the HSM was developed with its primary focus as the individual’s efforts to judge a
situation accurately. Soon after its creation, Trumbo (1999) noted that, “initial research
has suggested that this model [the HSM] may have promise for describing how people
use information to make a judgment about risk”
(p. 391). His perspective was borne out in subsequent risk communication research
conducted using the HSM model, some of which is discussed later in this literature
review.
In the ELM, Petty & Cacioppo (1986) identify two processing routes, or
pathways, to attitude change: central and peripheral. They define elaboration as “the
extent to which a person scrutinizes the issue-relevant arguments contained in the
persuasive communication” (p. 7), a process that occurs along a continuum “going from
‘no thought’ about the issue-relevant information presented, to complete elaboration of
every argument, and complete integration of these elaborations into the person’s attitude
schema” (p. 8). Geiger and Newhagen (1993) use different terms, “controlled” and
“automatic,” to describe the processes that Petty & Cacioppo term “central” and
“peripheral”: “Controlled attention is synonymous with mental effort and is dictated by
the goals of the individual processor. Automatic attention does not require the use of
limited resources, and is determined by attributes of the information” (p. 44).
The ELM theory is based upon seven postulates, the first of which is duplicated in
the HSM model: “people are motivated to hold correct attitudes” (p. 5). The others are:
2) the amount and type of processing varies between individuals and situations; 3)
attitude change is subject to variables; 4) variables affecting motivation and/or ability to
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process a message can enhance or reduce argument scrutiny; 5) variables with a relatively
biased effect can affect processing either positively or negatively; 6) as motivation/ability
to process decreases, the importance of peripheral cues increases, and the reverse is true;
and 7) attitude changes from processing have greater “temporal persistence” than those
resulting from peripheral cues (p. 5).
In the ELM, when elaboration likelihood is low, the acceptance or rejection of the
message does not come as a result of a systematic cognitive process in which the key
elements of the message are evaluated for validity that results in attitude change, but as a
result of association of the message with positive or negative peripheral cues. The authors
argue that central processing is semantic in nature, while peripheral processing can be
either semantic or non-semantic. In their view, peripheral cues are powerful, having the
ability to produce attitude change without the occurrence of any cognitive processing of
the message arguments.
The authors note that the message recipient is motivated to reject “counterattitudinal messages, yet the reception of these messages has the effect of enhancing the
recipient’s ability to refute the counterargument” (p. 144). This observation is supported
by the research of McGuire and Papageorgis (1962), who found that hearing a
“refutational defense” was effective in the construction of counterarguments. They used a
memorable analogy to describe this process, that of medical inoculation, in which a
weakened form of a virus is injected into the recipient to “stimulate, without overcoming,
his defenses” (p. 25). The results of their research became known as “inoculation theory,”
and their findings have been supported by other research (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Petty
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and Cacioppo claim that several other theories can be reasonably housed within the
framework of their ELM by placement on an elaboration likelihood continuum, including
the inoculation theory of McGuire and Papageorgis (1962), and the Theories of Reasoned
Action and Planned Behavior developed by Ajzen (1996).
Working within the ELM Model, Renn and Levine (1991) found that people with
more education expressed confidence in “the system” but a lack of confidence in the
leaders of that system, while the obverse was true for less educated people – they tended
to distrust the system but had more trust in its leaders (p. 202). Utilizing a psychometric
model, Slovic (1992) argues that risk is inherently subjective and cultural, that there is no
such thing as “real risk” or “objective risk.” He argues that risk is a concept invented by
people to “help them understand and cope with the dangers and uncertainties of life,” and
that risk does not exist “independent of our minds and cultures” (p. 119).
The Heuristic-Systematic Model (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Chaiken, Liberman, &
Eagly,1989), as the title implies, focuses on two methods of information processing used
by message recipients, “heuristic” and “systematic,” in what they term a “dual-process
model” (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, p.305). Chaiken et al. (1989) describe systematic
processing as “a comprehensive, analytic orientation in which perceivers access and
scrutinize all informational input for its relevance and importance to their judgment task,
and integrate all useful information in forming their judgments” (p. 212). In contrast,
heuristic processing is “a more limited processing mode that demands much less
cognitive effort and capacity than systematic processing” and in which the individual
accesses “that subset of available information that enables them to use simple inferential
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rules, schemata, or cognitive heuristics to formulate their judgments and decisions” (p.
213). Eagly and Chaiken (1993) note that the two processes often occur simultaneously,
are interrelated, and are not mutually exclusive. In their view, heuristic processing
requires less cognitive effort and resources than does systematic, and relies on simple
“decision rules, schemata, or heuristics” in order to judge message validity (p. 327).
The HSM theory is based on the concept of attitude, which Eagly and Chaiken
define as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity
with some degree of favor or disfavor” (p. 1). There is a behavioral element to this
construct, as the authors view attitude as an “acquired behavioral disposition,”
acknowledging a temporal component of attitude development (p. 2). The model divides
attitudinal responses into three categories of “evaluative responses”: cognitive, affective,
and behavioral, all emanating from an original stimulus or stimuli that generate an
attitude, which can, through observation, be inferred from the response. Using the
expectancy value model, the attitudes can be viewed as a function of beliefs that are
“represented as the sum of the expected values of the attributes ascribed to the attitude
object” (p. 106). These attitudes can also be viewed as a type of schema, a “broader
classification of cognitive structures” (p. 18).
The HSM theory includes a key assumption that the individual holds “the desire
to form or to hold valid, accurate attitudes” (Chaiken et al.,1989, p. 214), an assumption
which, as noted above, it shares with the ELM theory of Petty and Cacioppo. Chaiken et
al also note that both heuristic and systematic processing are employed to achieve this
goal. The authors characterize this type of processing as “open-minded” (p. 235), in
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contrast to what they term “defense motivation,” in which the message recipients seek
only to verify an expert position that agrees with theirs, or refute a position which
doesn’t. The authors describe defense motivation as “closed-minded” (p. 236). They
acknowledge the importance of cognitive availability for heuristic information
processing, and differences in individual “needs for cognition” (“NFC”), a concept also
utilized, as the authors note, by Petty and Cacioppo in their ELM model. Not
surprisingly, the authors note that systematic processing is “more effortful than heuristic
processing,” and that “systematic processing both demands and consumes cognitive
capacity, whereas heuristic processing makes relatively few capacity demands” (p. 218).
A key concept in the HSM is the principle of sufficiency, which postulates that
message recipients “must strike a balance between minimizing their processing efforts
and maximizing their judgmental confidence” (p. 221). The authors offer a definition of
the sufficiency principle:
In general…people will exert whatever level of effort is required to attain a
sufficient degree of confidence that they have satisfactorily accomplished their
processing goals. In validity seeking persuasion settings, the principle asserts that
recipients will invest whatever amount of effort is required to attain a sufficiently
confident assessment of validity of a message’s advocated position (p. 221).

It is important to note that Eagly and Chaiken site their model in the field of
persuasion: “The heuristic-systematic model was developed for application to validityseeking persuasion settings in which people’s primary motivational concern is to attain
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accurate attitudes that square with relevant facts” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 326).
Trumbo (1999) notes that like the ELM before it, the HSM “resides in a collection of
persuasion-based models that examine information processing as an antecedent to attitude
formation” (p. 391). He notes that “recent work has examined defense- and impressionmotivation (respectively, the desire to hold attitudes congruent with material or personal
interests and the desire to hold attitudes that will smooth social relations),” and that the
model has attempted to expand its scope through examination of factors including source
credibility, argument ambiguity and task importance, but that “the model’s application to
risk judgment and risk communication is still grounded in the original and more basic
form of the model that has as its primary focus the individual’s efforts to judge a situation
accurately” (p. 392). He notes that “recent experimental work has sought to expand the
model’s application to domains beyond persuasion by further developing understanding
of the function of motivation” (p. 397).
Trumbo asks rhetorically, “How does heuristic and systematic processing relate to
risk judgment?” (p. 398). He argues that “intuition, and some weight of the literature,”
would lead one to expect that the systematic processing route, which involves the
examination of facts, would lead to a judgment of lesser risk that that of the less effortful
heuristic path. But in his study of cancer risks (Trumbo, 1999), he found just the
opposite: Heuristic processing was associated with judgment of lower risk, and
systematic processing was associated with judgment of higher risk (p. 398). Trumbo
argues that these results run contrary to the notion that getting people to think more
rationally about risks will decrease overreactions to threats. In a later study of cancer
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risks, Trumbo (2008) again found that “systematic processing has a positive relationship
with risk perception while heuristic processing has an inverse relationship” (p. 15). But is
this really counter-intuitive? Since messages of risk are often based upon scientific
information, it would seem logical that they would require more systematic processing in
order to be effective. And, if they are effective, it stands to reason that they would
produce a heightened appreciation (or sense) of risk. But possession of a heightened
sense of risk of does not rule out the possession of a similarly heightened sense of
preparedness. The biblical story of Noah comes to mind as an example. As a result of risk
messages from God, Noah had a heightened sense of risk from the impending flood. But
the messages were not only effective in increasing his sense of risk, but also in
motivating him to act upon that heightened sense of risk to build an ark. So Noah
possessed heightened senses of both risk and preparedness.
Trumbo (2002) has attempted to expand the reach of the HSM by adapting it to
evaluated survey data in assessing information processing of and reactions to risk
messages. In this study, Trumbo argues that, “No basis exists within the HSM or risk
perception for the prediction of how motivation, ability, or sufficiency should directly
predict perception of risk” (p. 371). He proposes a model in which the processing modes
(heuristic and systematic) are uncorrelated, and instead “act as intervening variables
between the antecedents [motivation, ability, sufficiency] and risk perception” (p. 372).
Trumbo’s study supported his previous argument (1999) noted above, that “systematic
processing consistently predicted the perception of greater levels of risk, and heuristic
processing consistently predicted lesser risk perceptions” (Trumbo, 2002, pp. 379-380).
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In a study of the function of credibility on risk communication, Trumbo and
McComas (2003) constructed an HSM model, illustrated through path analysis, that
followed Trumbo’s (2002) suggestion of treating the two HSM processing pathways,
systematic and heuristic, as “intervening variables between credibility and risk
perception” (p. 350). They found that “information credibility does have an influence
over risk perception, and that a relatively small but significant amount of this influence is
transmitted about equally through both forms of information processing” (p. 350). But
risk communication occurs in a social context, one in which, as Kasperson (1992) notes,
“the experience of risk is therefore both an experience of physical harm and the result of
culture and social processes by which individuals or groups acquire or create
interpretations of hazards” (p. 159). Earle and Cvetkovich ((1999) note that risk
communication in a social context leads to the development of “shared meaning among
individuals, institutions, and communities establishing relationships of trust” (p. 85).
Drawing on the availability heuristic concept that would later be explored by
researchers in the HSM model, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) found that “people rely on
a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing
probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, these
heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors” (p.
1124). Among the devices they identified were the use of “causal schemas” by which
people organized events into cause-effect relations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982).
Fischoff , Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1985) found that people use a form of cost/benefit
analysis to determine acceptable levels of risk. Brashers (2001) notes that uncertainty is a
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two-edged sword: In some circumstances people find it threatening and wish to reduce it,
while in others, e.g., someone with a chronic illness, it is employed to help maintain hope
(p. 491).
Working within the HSM model, Trumbo and McComas (2008) found a
correlation between the level of trust for civic groups or trust for industry and state and
the method of processing of risk messages and the perception of risk. Those who had
higher trust for industry and state and lower trust for civic groups tended toward heuristic
processing and lower risk perceptions. Those who had higher trust for civic groups and
lower trust for industry and state tended toward systematic processing and higher risk
perceptions (p. 61). Earle and Cvetkovich (1995), however, argue that the obverse of
social trust, social distrust, is a “fundamental component of American individualism,” an
integral part of the dominant culture, and functions as “problem-solving strategy for the
reduction of cognitive complexity” (p. 47). This would appear to contradict the position
of Trumbo and McComas that distrust of institutions leads to greater reliance on
systematic processing. The challenge, it would appear, is to construct risk communication
research utilizing the HSM model in such a way as to account for the influence of the
socio-cultural contexts in which it occurs, with particular attention to the levels of social
trust and where it resides.
If the processing dynamics reported by Trumbo and McComas were operative
during Hurricane Katrina, it could be expected that people who had higher trust for civic
groups, and relied on the systematic processing path, would have had a higher
expectation of risk and personal harm, while those who had higher trust for the state, and
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followed the heuristic route, should have had lower expectations of risk and personal
harm. This is one of the areas this study is designed to explore. It may also help to
illuminate the influence of race and socioeconomic status on the processing of risk
messages by the heuristic or systematic pathways.
Trumbo (1999) offers a caution and suggested modifications to increase the
effectiveness of the HSM in risk communication settings: “The HSM can go only so far
in describing the experience people have with risk. Other individual factors – and socialstructural factors – should be included in models to describe people’s experiences more
comprehensively” (p. 398). Trumbo and other researchers have used the HSM model
effectively to explore risk communication in subsequent studies. In their discussion of the
use of the HSM model for risk communication research, Griffin, Dunwoody, and
Neuwirth (1999) argue for what they term a “bottoms-up approach” to risk
communication design, one which “calls for a focus on understanding the evaluative
behaviors of the information user” (p. S231). They see the bifurcated pathways of
heuristic and systematic processing to be highly applicable to risk communication
processing:
We suggest that the heuristic-systematic distinction may be at work in one’s
assessment of risks and one’s own related behaviors. Some individuals, under
some conditions, will gather a lot of information about a risk and will make an
effort to evaluate that information systematically before reaching a decision about
what to do about the risk. Others [will] take the heuristic route, utilizing various
superficial cues to reach decisions (e.g., “I hate EPA, so anything that EPA says
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is wrong”) (p. S237).

In a longitudinal study of the health risks of Great Lakes fish consumption,
Kahlor, Dunwoody, Griffin, Neuwirth, and Giese (2003) found the HSM model useful in
determining the audience’s needs in order to craft more effective risk communication
messages. In particular, they found the model helpful in identifying the difference
between the audience’s perception of what it needs to know and the intended “real”
information that the message creators wish to communicate. They argue that the HSM
model can be used to craft more effective risk messages that recognize and address the
social contexts in which they are to be received (p. 366). Trumbo and McComas (2003)
utilized the HSM model in an analysis of survey data on health-based risk message
campaigns on different issues of local interest in a number of American cities in the late
1990s. They found that “information credibility does have an influence over risk
perception, and that a small but significant amount of this influence is transmitted about
equally through both forms [heuristic and systematic] of information processing” (p.
350).
Eagly and Chaiken (1993) present an extensive comparison of ELM and HSM,
which they term “process theories of attitude formation” (p. 305). The HSM developed as
an alternative to the ELM, one which its authors hoped would produce more quantitative
data, in contrast to the ELM, which they viewed as more descriptive than explanatory (p.
321). They identify the key weakness of the ELM as the lack of detail expressed in the
peripheral route, i.e., the model concentrates its power and focus on the central
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processing route, and assigns what does not fit in that pathway to the peripheral route.
The authors argue that the model functions best when elaboration likelihood is high, and
information is processed through the central pathway, and does not function nearly as
well when elaboration likelihood is low, and goes through the peripheral route, where the
processing is neither defined nor explored (p. 345). They argue that this bifurcation
detracts from the usefulness of the model as an “integrative theoretical framework” (p.
323).
This discussion of risk communication theory and research has, for the most part,
concentrated on message processing. The ELM, HSM, and the other models discussed
are primarily concerned with the mechanics of that process within the individual message
recipient. But what about the sources of those of messages, and the relationship between
the individual message recipient and those sources? This review of the literature will next
explore Media System Dependency Theory, which addresses the relationship between the
message recipient and a primary source of messages of risk: the mass media.

Media System Dependency Theory
In outlining the structure of their model for their media dependency theory (also
known as Media System Dependency, or “MSD”), Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur argue that
mass communication is a dynamic process that occurs in a complex environment made
up of three elements, which they describe as a “tripartite audience-media-society
relationship” (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976, p. 5). They argue that in order to
understand mass communication effects, it is necessary to identify a set of variables that
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affect the communication process in each of the three areas (audience, media, and
society), and then, through the research process, to determine how these variables are
related “individually, interactively, and systemically” (p. 5). Although this model was
first presented more than 30 years ago, it offers a valuable theoretical perspective that can
serve to inform risk communication research, as it sites the message processing of the
individual in a larger social context.
Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur offer a list of “cognitive effects” that occur in the
media-dependent urban-industrial environment that they describe, including the creation
and resolution of ambiguity, attitude formation, agenda setting, expansion of people’s
belief systems, and an impact on values (pp. 9-13). Following Katz and Lazarsfeld
(1955), they note the role of “community opinion leaders” in selectively channeling
audience attention to a mass media message and influencing the content or intensity of
attitude formation (p. 11). They argue that the more that mass media systems serve
unique and central information functions in a society, the greater the dependency of that
society on the mass media for that information. They also argue that the higher the degree
of structural instability in a society due to conflict and change, the greater the potential
for mass media dependency (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976, p. 7). In a study of food risk
conducted in the MSD model, Whaley and Tucker (2004) found that, “Trust in sources
was the best predictor of media system dependency,” and “those with higher levels of
trust in government and expert sources were more likely to express higher levels of media
dependency” (p. 23).
Working within an expanded MSD model, Matei and Ball-Rokeach (2003) sought
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to understand how the emergence of the Internet affected the communication process in
minority ethnic communities in Los Angeles. The authors sought “to go beyond it [MSD]
to more inclusive consideration of the interplay between interpersonal and mediated
storytelling systems and their contexts” (p. 645). For the purposes of their study, they
grouped communication into three categories: 1) macroagents - institutions, newspapers,
national television networks, cable systems, public relations agencies – with target
populations a city, region, or nation;
2) mesoagents – local publications, communications departments of community
organizations – with target populations a certain part of a city and/or certain residents;
and 3) microagents – “individuals or grassroots informal residential networks and the
communications processes they foster” – these individuals/networks “carry the most
concrete burden of ‘storytelling’ in their neighborhoods (p. 646). The authors then
measured micro-, meso-, and macro-storytelling at the individual level. Their research
showed that the Internet functions as a meso-linkage in the community and indirectly
contributes to a sense of belonging in the community. They found that “Internet
connectedness is positively associated with community organization membership; people
who connect to the Internet are 1.4 times more likely to be members of community
organizations” (p. 652). They argue that “the Internet is a weak and peripheral, but
present, component of the communication structure that contributes to belonging” (p.
652). In a related observation, they found that “mainstream media connectors are 1.8
times more likely to be low ‘belongers’ and 1.7 times [more likely to be] nonmembers of
community organizations,” and that “mainstream media is not one of the components of
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the communication infrastructure that contribute to belonging” (p. 652). They note that
“the role of the Internet … was independent of that of old mainstream media, and it was
associated with connections to community organizations” (p. 655). This trend has
continued and expanded with the rise in use and popularity of social networking sites
such as Facebook, which claims some 500 million active users (facebook.com).
Community organizations use social networking sites such as Facebook as a low-cost
method of communication with their members.
In their discussion of the agenda setting function in their media dependency
model, Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur are careful to note that it occurs as an “interactional
process” (p. 12). They argue that media messages, “filtered” through “media informationgathering and –processing systems,” are then processed by the public “as a function of
both their societal strata and categories” (p. 12). They argue that mass media are the
primary “signaling source” for emergencies, that media dependency results in changes in
the beliefs (values), feelings (affect), and behavior (actions) of the audience, and that the
degree of dependency is positively correlated with the degree of change and conflict in
the society. Although postulated within media dependency theory, the model proposed by
Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur describes a communication process in which a dynamic
interaction of variables is at work between and among all points in the communication
continuum. Ball-Rokeach (1998) notes the central role that this interaction plays in MSD
theory. She cites the existence of “cross-level effects hypotheses,” which she explains as
follows: “MSD theory forces consideration of effects in ecological terms, where effects
on individuals mix with effects on interpersonal networks that in turn mix with
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organizational effects, which in turn mix with system effects” (p. 23). Although these
cross-level effects hypotheses acknowledge that information exchange and influence is
bi-directional between its components (individuals-interpersonal networks-organizational
effects-system effects), Ball-Rokeach is careful in pointing out that the effects are more
powerful when moving down the chain from the macro (system) level to the micro
(individual) level than they are in moving up, where the effects are diminished at each
step of the process.
Working from the MSD model, Loges (1994) conducted a random telephone
survey of residents of San Bernardino, California and Austin, Texas, on issues of
environmental threat, in order to test “the fundamental proposition that increases in threat
are associated with increases in the intensity of dependency relations” (p. 9). Loges found
that, “higher perceptions of threat in the environment are associated with more intense
MSD relations,” which he notes “lend support to one of the fundamental propositions
underlying MSD theory” (p. 17).
In a longitudinal study based in the media dependency model relevant to this
project, Beaudoin (2008) conducted a panel telephone survey of Black adults in New
Orleans post-Katrina, to determine the effectiveness of a media campaign to promote safe
behavior “in regards to household chemicals, breathing masks, and other protective gear”
in the recovery phase that occurred in the aftermath of the storm (p. 13). Beaudoin notes
the heightened impact that natural disasters have on poor communities: “Because
disasters exacerbate preexisting social inequalities, the negative effects of Hurricane
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Katrina would be expected to be especially great on a poor and underserved population,
such as African Americans in New Orleans” (p. 8).
The media campaign Beaudoin studied targeted African Americans in the New
Orleans metro area, and was conducted by means of a radio advertising campaign
utilizing “African American personalities, straight-forward wording, and jazz- and hip
hop-influenced background music” (p. 8). The messages ran from June 12 to August 25,
2006 (one year after the storm). Beaudoin sought to understand how “[media]
dependency relates to the manner by which a person’s satisfaction of needs and
attainment of goals are contingent on media information resources” (p. 2). His findings
are consistent with the MSD model, in that in an atmosphere where perceived threat is
heightened mass media use increases, and, in this case, positive behavior change
occurred, i.e., an increase in safety-oriented behavior. As Beaudoin states:
The effect of news and the media campaign, as well as high levels of related
use, are generally consistent with the theoretical contention that, in times of
societal change and conflict, media dependency and the effects of such
dependency are intensified, with such effects culminating in behavior change
(p. 13).

However, Beaudoin found that although the media campaign designed to increase
safety behavior in the wake of Hurricane Katrina was effective in doing so, it was
unsuccessful in 56
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56changing the underlying safety beliefs. This finding is particularly relevant to this
study. Beaudoin was studying the effectiveness of a campaign targeted to post-disaster
behavior, what he calls the “recovery phase of a catastrophe” (p. 13). This campaign was
designed to promote specific safety behaviors (e.g., use of breathing masks and protective
gear) against specific threats in the immediate environment (e.g., household chemicals) in
the wake of the storm. In that context, it could be argued that changing underlying beliefs
is not nearly as important as changing behavior. The designers of the campaign sought to
encourage specific behaviors against specific threats, and were successful in doing so.
But what about media campaigns designed to influence behaviors before a natural
disaster such as Hurricane Katrina, one in which the threat is neither specific nor
immediate until it arrives, at which point it is often too late to react? If such a media
campaign is unable to influence the underlying attitudes and beliefs that fuel behaviors,
will it be successful in producing behaviors that require radical and immediate changes in
daily life, such as the abandonment of a home and personal possessions in the face of an
oncoming storm? And if not, how can such a campaign be constructed?

Uses and Gratifications Theory
Since this inquiry seeks to understand how individuals approach and process
messages of risk, it can be further illuminated by the findings of research in Uses and
Gratifications Theory (“U&G”). Sandra Ball-Rokeach (1998) offers a bridge between the
MSD and U&G models. While noting that both models postulate an active audience, she
draws a key distinction between them. She argues that U&G theorists are primarily
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concerned with “the individual’s molding of media content to gratify needs,” while MSD
theorists view “the audience member’s behavior vis-à-vis the media as more constrained
and determined by social forces” (p. 26). She draws a further distinction based on
audience behavior, arguing that the MSD researcher is concerned with “cross-level
consequences for individuals and their interpersonal networks - the dynamics of their
inner worlds and how they live in their social worlds,” while the U&G researcher is
focused on “the individual’s attraction to media texts and the interaction between text and
reader to better understand the contributions of reader characteristics to text processing”
(p. 31).
Researchers in the U&G perspective seek to understand the attitudes and behavior
of audiences in their use of the mass media. Rubin (2002) outlines five assumptions of
the U&G theory, summarized as follows:
1) Communication behavior, including media selection and use, is goal-directed,
purposive, and motivated.
2) People are active communicators, not passive consumers of media. They select
and use media to satisfy felt needs and desires.
3) Communication messages are filtered through the receiver’s personality, social
category and relationships, interpersonal interaction, and availability of communication
channels.
4) Media compete with alternative forms of communication, including
interpersonal interaction, for selection and use.
5) People are often more influential than the media in this process (pp. 527-528).
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Although Rubin’s observations are made from within the framework of Uses and
Gratifications Theory, they are consistent with those that emerge in the risk
communication research discussed in this section. For example, Kasperson (1992)
describes recipients of risk communication messages as purposive, goal-directed
consumers of risk messages, who operate in a social environment in which messages are
selected (amplified) or deselected (attenuated) according to the socio-cultural context in
which the communication takes place. Renn (1991) notes the importance of
psychological, social, and cultural processes in risk communication. Earle and
Cvetkovich (1999) note the development of collective interpretations of risk in a
community that can override individual perceptions, and Fessenden-Raden et al. (1987)
note that social context shapes the message reception process.
Rubin (2002) argues that “a) by themselves, mass media typically are not
necessary or sufficient causes of audience effects, and (b) a medium or message is only a
single source of influence in the social and psychological environment, although it is an
important and crucial one” (p. 525). In a finding particularly relevant to this study, he
states:
Our predispositions, the environment in which we live, and our interpersonal
interactions shape our expectations about the media and media content.
Communication behavior responds to media and their messages as they are
filtered through our personalities, social categories, and relationships,
potential for interpersonal interaction, and communication channel availability
(p. 528).
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Rubin (2009) views the Uses and Gratifications perspective as a dynamic
communication environment where “individual, background differences play an
important role in media uses and effects because lifestyle and life position, including
social and psychological dispositions, affect communication motivation, the availability
of communication alternatives, and media reliance or dependency. People can only
choose from among the channels that are available to them”
(p. 153). McQuail (1977) identifies other mediating variables, including “internalization,”
which he defines as describing “influence guided by the receiver’s own pre-existing
motives, needs, and values” (p. 75). This is an important observation, since it
acknowledges the power of the media channels that convey the messages while
recognizing the influences at work within the individual message recipient that affect the
processing of those messages. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) position the concept of
internalization within the HSM model, arguing that “the message is evaluated in terms of
the abstract knowledge structures (i.e., beliefs, attitudes, and values) that are relevant to
the issue of the persuasive message,” and that “internalization occurs when a recipient
adopts the position recommended by the communicator because the position is congruent
with … one’s overall values” (p. 639). The authors connect the concept of internalization
with that of identification, in which “a [message] recipient adopts the position
recommended by the communicator because this change helps establish or maintain a
positive self-defining relationship with the communicator” (p. 639).
The recognition of the selective use of media as described by Rubin can be traced
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to the opinion research on voting of Katz and Lazarsfeld in the 1950s and 1960s, which
contributed to the development of the limited effects paradigm, including the two-step
theory of message communication that acknowledged the role of opinion makers in the
process (Petty, Priester, & Brinol, 2002). In his introduction to the second edition of
Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communication, the
work he co-authored with Paul Lazarsfeld in 1955, Katz identifies two elements that are
common to both the limited effects paradigm and U&G theory: “selectivity” and
“interpersonal relations” (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 2006). Although his perspective is limited
in scope, Katz sees audience selectivity driven by forces of defensiveness, interests, and
role obligations (ibid, p. xviii), and notes the influence that small groups and opinion
leaders wield on opinion formation (p. xx). Citing Klapper (1960), Baran and Davis
(2006) note the importance of “selective processes” that act as mediating influences on
message processing.” Also citing Klapper (1960), Rubin (2002) identifies mediating
variables that “intercede between a message and one’s response…[including] individual
predispositions and selective perception processes, group norms, message dissemination
via interpersonal channels, opinion leadership, and the free-enterprise nature of the media
in some societies”
(p. 525).
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Summary
MSD & U&G
When viewed as generalized theories, MSD and U&G would appear to be
contradictory, or even perhaps mutually exclusive. Its very title, “Media System
Dependency,” seems to imply a passive consumer of media messages. In contrast, by its
title, “Uses and Gratifications” implies an active consumer of media messages. But a
closer examination of the research conducted in each of these areas reveals that they are
neither contradictory nor mutually exclusive. Instead, they share a rather broad middle
ground to which each perspective contributes. MSD researchers note the influence of
interpersonal, organizational and system effects on the communication process of the
individual (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976; Matei & Ball-Rokeach, 2003); Ball-Rokeach,
1998), taking particular note of the influence of social strata and categories on message
reception (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976), areas of research more widely studied in the
U&G model. U&G researchers acknowledge the influence of media dependency (Rubin,
2009), while arguing that its influence is modified by other mediating variables within the
individual message recipient (McQuail, 1977), and argue that when these variables reflect
structures and beliefs that are congruent with those of the message communicator,
internalization of the message occurs (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Both perspectives, then,
serve to contribute to understanding of the message communication and reception
process, particularly in the area of risk communication, which often takes place in the
active, if not supercharged, socio-political-cultural atmosphere that exists in communities
threatened by disasters.
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Race, Class, Poverty, and Communication
“I’m from New Orleans, Louisiana and I was caught into the storm. I never
thought New Orleans would have done us the way they done us. I didn’t realize what was
going on until maybe the third day after I was trying to get out of that place – they would
not let us out. I was on top of the Interstate, the Interstate in front to the Superdome and
some guys came along in an Ozone Water truck and picked up a lot of people and we got
near as far as getting out. They turned us around with guns. The army turned us around
with guns. Policemen. And I realized then they really was keeping us in there. And you
want me to tell you the truth, my version of it? They tried to kill us. When you keep
somebody on top of the Interstate for five days, with no food and water, that’s killing
people. And there ain’t no ands, ifs, or buts about it, that was the NOPD [New Orleans
Police Department] killing people. Four people died around me. Four. Diabetes. I am a
diabetic and I survived it, by the grace of God, but I survived it. But they had people who
were worse off than me, and they didn’t make it. Old people. One young woman couldn’t
survive it because of the dehydration. So I mean, this is what you call NOPD murder.
Murder. That’s what I call it. What else would you call it?”
-Survivor, Hurricane Katrina (Stein & Press, 2008, pp. 225-226).
“I saw people where their family was separated – men from women, children
from the old and the sick from the well. And with no communication. They didn’t know
where others had gone, and they just began to panic in desperation, ‘Where’s my wife?
Where’s my mother? Where’s my child? Where’s my daddy? What happened to our
house?’ They were, like, disoriented. It looked like the hull of a slave ship experience.”
-Rev. Jesse Jackson (Dyson, 2006, p. 81).
“You simply get chills every time you see these poor individuals … so many of
these people … are so poor and they are so black.”
— Wolf Blitzer, CNN, September 1, 2005 (Stivers, 2007, p. 48)
As noted in the research cited above, communication cannot be separated from
the social-economic-political-cultural-temporal context in which it occurs. And as this
study focuses on the communication of risk messages in post-Katrina New Orleans, it is
important to note the particular context that defined this truly unique American city when
Katrina struck it on August 29, 2005. One of the social factors that makes New Orleans
unique is the tightly knit family and extended family units living in close proximity to
each other, creating bonds and pathways of communication reinforced with blood and
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ancestry (Troutt, 2006).
The use of the past tense in describing pre-Katrina New Orleans is important,
because time is an important element of context, and the New Orleans of today is very
different from the New Orleans of August 2005. In fact, the New Orleans of September
2005 was radically different than that of August 2005. Katrina transformed New Orleans,
remaking it in ways with an outcome that is yet to be determined. Most apparent in that
transformation is the effect on the city’s black population and racial makeup. It could be
argued that Katrina was a Holocaust by hurricane.
Hurricane Katrina effected a social reconfiguration of New Orleans. U.S. Census
data estimates taken in 2004, one year before the storm, revealed a total population for
the city of 444, 515, of which 124,591 (28.03%) were white and 302,041 (67.5%) were
black. In 2006, one year after the hurricane, the total population had been cut in half to
223,388 (50.25%). The white population had been reduced by 42,484 (-34.1%), while the
black population had been reduced by 170,600 (-56.48%). These demographic changes
resulted in a very different racial mix for New Orleans pre-storm and post-storm. The
pre-Katrina racial mix was 68% black, 28% white; immediately post-Katrina it was 59%
black, 37% white (U.S. Census, 2004, 2006). By the time of the 2010 Census, five years
after Katrina, the population of New Orleans had risen to 343,829, or 77% of the 2004
level, with 206,871 black (60%), and 113,428 white (32%) (U.S. Census, 2010).
Race and poverty are inextricable intertwined, and Hurricane Katrina had major
impacts on both in New Orleans. In 2004, the median household income in New Orleans
was $33,036; by 2009, it had risen to $40,000, a 21.08% increase (U.S. Census 2004;
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U.S. Census 2009). The federal poverty threshold in the United States is $21,200 for a
family of four (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2008). In 2004, 18% of
the households in New Orleans were below that threshold; in 2009, that figure had risen
slightly to 21%. From these data, it would appear that there is something of a hard
number poverty base in New Orleans, one that is resistant to even the power of a
hurricane. But a closer look at the racial makeup of these figures reveals a city that was
transformed by this natural disaster.
In 2004, there were 498,200 occupied housing units in New Orleans. By 2009,
that figure had fallen to 436,000, a 12.48% decrease. The number of White households
decreased by
10.65 % from 2004 to 2009, while the number of Black households decreased by 21.83%.
In 2004, There were 35,700 White households living below the poverty line
(39.8% of all households in poverty), which increased to 41,300 by 2009 (44.4%). There
were 50,700 Black households living below the poverty line in 2004 (56.5% of all
households in poverty), which decreased to 43,400 households by 2009 (46.67%). These
figures are consistent with the overall change in population noted above, which saw the
White population reduced by 42,282 and the Black population reduced by 170,600.
But the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the economic life of the city can most
dramatically be seen in the U.S. Census data on median household income. In 2004, the
median household income in New Orleans was $33,036. By 2009 it had risen to $40,000,
an increase of 21.08%. But the increase in median income was not even across races.
Hispanics, a small percentage of New Orleans households (0.06% in 2004, and 0.89% in
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2009) saw their median income rise from 36,305 to $40,000, a 10.18% increase. In the
same period, Blacks saw their median income rise from $24,456 to $26,268, just 7.4%. A
rising tide (or rising flood waters) does not lift all boats. Hurricane Katrina left New
Orleans a whiter, richer city, with about the same percentage of people living below the
poverty line (about 1 in 5), albeit of a slightly different racial mix.
Hurricane Katrina killed 1,836 people, placing it third in hurricane fatalities in
U.S. history (hurricanekatrinarelief.com). The vulnerability of New Orleans to hurricanes
and floods is a matter of record: 20% of claims in the U.S. for repeat losses under the
National Flood Insurance Program in the last 25 years have come from Orleans and
Jefferson parishes (Troutt, 2006). As Douglas Brinkley (2006) puts it, “In geographical
terms, New Orleans was no more stable than a delicate saucer floating in a bowl of water.
Any turbulence in the surrounding water is bound to flood the saucer” (p. 13).
In the Great Mississippi River Flood of 1927, officials dynamited a portion of the
levee in St. Bernard Parish, flooding predominantly black neighborhoods in an effort to
save the rest of the city (Brinkley, 2006; Ducre, 2008). Ducre reports that Blacks were
forced at gunpoint to repair the levees, and some 13,000 Blacks were forced to actually
live on the damaged levees (Ducre, 2008, p. 69), a story eerily similar to the account of
the Katrina survivor quoted above, who was forced to live on an Interstate overpass for
five days. Ever since the 1927 flood, Blacks in Louisiana have distrusted the levee
boards, fearing that if they had blown the levees up once, exposing them to flood waters
to protect the Whites, they would do it again (Brinkley, 2006). When Hurricane Betsy
struck in 1965, it flooded the virtually all-black Ninth Ward of New Orleans with several
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feet of water, creating a scene that President Lyndon Johnson described on a personal
visit to a shelter there as a “mass of human suffering” (Graham, 2008). The topography
of New Orleans favors a racial divide: the lower, more dangerous ground has long been
inhabited by the poor and mostly black, while the safer, higher ground has been occupied
by whites (Dyson, 2006).
From a historical perspective, the devastation of Hurricane Katrina was
unprecedented. Although, as Elliot and Pais (2006) report, other disasters have killed
more people (the Galveston Hurricane of 1900 killed 10,000), and the San Francisco
Earthquake of 1906 displaced 200,000, FEMA reports that 1.36 million people filed for
federal assistance as a direct result of Hurricane Katrina, while the Red Cross reported
operating 707 temporary shelters for Katrina evacuees in 24 states and Washington, D.C.
(p. 302). In their analysis of a Red Cross database of more than 460,000 Katrina
survivors, Elliott and Pais found a small subgroup population (5%) of New Orleans that
reported never leaving the area – and they were almost exclusively Black. Yet beyond
that small group, it was income, not race, which was the most significant factor in the
choice between staying and evacuating: “New Orleanians with household incomes in the
$40,000-$50,000 range were nearly twice as likely as those in the $10,000-$20,000 range
to evacuate before, as opposed to after, the storm,” they write. “This class difference
climbs to nearly threefold when predicting odds of not evacuating the city at all” (p. 308).
In an important observation, the most common reason given for not evacuating prior to
the storm (49%) was that people thought the storm would not be as bad as predicted. That
was more than double the 21% who said they were too poor or lacked the necessary
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transportation to leave. Blacks were more likely than Whites to believe the storm was
going to be less devastating than predicted (p. 317).
Researchers have noted that ethnicity is a socially constructed concept. Following
Van den Berghe (1967), Perry and Mushkatel (1984) argue that, “Ethnicity reflects the
extent to which an individual feels, or is made to feel, a member of some ethnic group”
(p. 33). In the context of risk communication, they argue that ethnicity affects three
variables in warning response models: perceived personal risk, kin relationships, and
community involvement. In an observation that connects race, class, and disaster
response, the authors note that in studies of Texas towns faced with tornado warnings,
Black families did not react as strongly to the warning messages as did White families, a
response that was attributed in part to different economic realities for each, as the Black
families “were very poor and immersed in the constant problems of economic survival”
(p. 33). The authors argue that the extended families in minority groups make disaster
response more difficult, as there are more members of the family “to be accounted for in
connection with undertaking protective actions in response to disaster warnings” (p. 34).
They note that although minorities have been found to be less involved in traditional
community organizations than Whites, Blacks have been found to be “more involved in
religious organizations than other Americans” (p. 35).
The beginning of the risk communication process for Katrina can be traced back
to July of 2004, one year before Katrina made landfall, with the funding by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) of a hurricane simulation exercise in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, “Hurricane Pam,” to study the potential impact of a Category 3 or
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greater hurricane striking the Gulf Coast area (FEMA, 2004). FEMA also commissioned
Integrated Emergency Management, Inc. (“IEM”), a Baton Rouge firm that specializes in
“catastrophic planning and preparedness” (Committee on Homeland Security, 2006) to
prepare a “Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Functional Plan” based on the
findings of the Hurricane Pam exercise. A draft of the report was released on August 6,
2004, more than a year prior to Katrina (IEM, 2004). FEMA issued a press release at the
conclusion of the exercise on July 23, 2004 that said, “”Hurricane Pam brought sustained
winds of 120 mph, up to 20 inches of rain in parts of southeast Louisiana and storm surge
that topped levees in the New Orleans area. More than one million residents evacuated
and Hurricane Pam destroyed 500,000-600,000 buildings” (FEMA, 2004).
In a study of community vulnerability in Hurricane Andrew, which struck South
Florida in 1992, Morrow (2000) argues that poorer households do not have the financial
resources to purchase supplies before a natural disaster or for buying necessary services
and materials afterwards, which results in higher mortality rates and greater housing
damage. In a finding with great relevance to New Orleans and Katrina, Morrow notes
that, “The dwellings of the poor are often located in vulnerable locations, such as
floodplains.” She writes, “In addition to threatening their lives, a flood or storm virtually
erases whatever possessions they may have accumulated, and is likely to result in their
loss of ‘place’” (p. 3). Morrow also found that “minorities [were] more likely to rely on
kin and social networks for [risk] information” (p. 8). Researchers have noted that
differences in socioeconomic status can result in differences in availability of
information, a phenomenon that Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien (1970) termed the
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“knowledge gap”:
As the infusion of mass media information into a social system increases,
segments of the population with higher socioeconomic status tend to acquire
this information at a faster rate than the lower status segments, so that the gap
in knowledge between these segments tends to increase (p. 159).

The knowledge gap argument seems particularly applicable to New Orleans,
which, as noted above, appears to have built-in poverty base of some 20% of the
population. The increase in the “infusion of mass media” to which Tichenor et al refer is
to a large extent technology dependent, as media messages are increasingly conveyed by
electronics rather than print. Computer access is required to access much of that
information, and in the rapidly changing world of online communication, that access
must be regular and frequent in order to be effective. The ability to enjoy that kind of
access is likely limited in the 20 percent of New Orleans households that are trying to
survive on less than $20,000 a year. The inability and/or failure to take advantage of the
increased amount of information available puts the poorest segment of the population at a
distinct competitive disadvantage in the communication marketplace, as they are forced
to make decisions based on incomplete and sometimes insufficient information.
Morrow (2000) argues that the elderly are more likely to suffer in natural disasters
than younger people, as they are “more likely to lack the physical and economic
resources necessary for effective response, are more likely to suffer health-related
consequences and be slower to recover” (p. 4). Gullette (2006) reports that 78% of the
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fatalities from Katrina were people over the age of 51, while 39% were over 75, 25%
were between 61 and 75 (p. 104). This was also true in Hurricane Audrey, which struck
Louisiana in 1957. Deaths of those 60-69 and 70 and over were more than twice those of
any other 10-year age segment of the population. Losses (missing or identified dead) by
race were even more greatly disproportionate: 322 “Negro” losses per 1,000 population,
as compared to 38 for the “White” population (Bates, Fogelman, Parenton, Pittman, &
Tracy, 1958). In her study of the data from Hurricane Andrew, Morrow (2000) found that
in a disaster context women sustained more harm than men, due to their traditional roles
as care-givers for the family, which are housing-dependent, as well as their lower work
status in jobs in the “informal economy,” jobs which “are subject to fluctuation in the
best of times and likely to disappear completely after an event, unnoticed by authorities”
(p.9).
The disproportionally higher impact of natural disasters on minorities that appears
in the research is exacerbated by media framing. When media place poverty in a social
frame, audiences are more likely to attribute it to societal causes, but when the media
frame poverty individually, audiences are more likely to blame the individual depicted
for his/her own plight (Iyengar, 1997). The framing of Black poverty in the media
“increases the degree to which viewers hold individuals responsible for racial inequality”
(Iyengar, 1991, p. 67). Television viewers are given only implicit information about the
relationship among poverty, race and crime, leaving them unable to put that information
into context (Entman, 1997). The framing of social and economic risk also breaks down
along racial lines (Gandy, 1997). “Race” as we know it is a constructed social category
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(Downing & Husband, 2005), and agenda setting and framing play a large role in that
construction.
The racial framing of Hurricane Katrina was exemplified in two photos and
captions by the Associated Press from the disaster (Dyson, 2006). The first photo shows a
young black man wading through waist-deep water carrying food items floating beside
him. The caption reads: “A young man walks though chest deep flood waters after
looting a grocery store in New Orleans on Tuesday, Aug., 20, 2005.” The second photo
shows a young white couple in an almost identical shot, towing food in the flood waters.
The caption reads: “Two residents wade through chest-deep water after finding bread and
soda from a local grocery store after Hurricane Katrina came through the area in New
Orleans, Louisiana.” Two photographs of people performing virtually identical actions –
and two very different frames. The black man is framed as an outsider, an interloper, a
criminal, and a thief. The white couple belongs there (“residents”) and show agency
(“finding bread and soda”) and survival skills. The equations are as simple as the
contrast:
Black = outsider, criminal, other; White = resident, survivor, us. With this framing, it is
easy to perceive the Whites as victims, and the Blacks as cold aggressors – “us” and
“them.”
Blumler and Gurevitch (2000) approach this social and cultural fragmentation
from the perspective of message communication. In an analysis of political
communication, they argue that in order to be effective, future mass media messaging
“may increasingly address the particular identities and concerns of culturally distinct
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subgroups” (p. 161). Other researchers have explored the relationship between race and
class, and some have argued that class has become more significant than race. Wilson
(1978) explores what he terms the “intersection of class with race,” arguing that “the
economic class position of individual minorities is heavily determined by race” (pp. ix-x).
He notes, “As the influence of race on minority class-stratification decreases, then, of
course, class takes on greater importance in determining the life chances of minority
individuals” (p. x). Elliott and Pais (2006) note that one effect of the changing social
strata that has enabled Blacks to rise into the middle class has been the creation of a black
underclass, “which has become socially and culturally isolated from mainstream society
as jobs, taxes, and upwardly mobile blacks have left historically black ghettos” (p. 298).
Reed (as cited in Elliott & Pais, 2006) illustrates Wilson’s point in his observations on
Hurricane Katrina:
Class – as income, wealth, and access to material resources, including a safety
net of social connections – was certainly a better predictor than race of who
evacuated [New Orleans] before the hurricane, who was able to survive the storm
itself, who was warehoused in the Superdome or convention center or stuck
without food and water on the parched overpasses, who is marooned in Houston
or elsewhere, and whose interests will be factored into the reconstruction of the
city, who will be able to return (p. 299).

These arguments seem to be borne out by the census data discussed above. One
thing that survived Hurricane Katrina virtually untouched in size, and only slightly in
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composition, was the hardcore underclass – that 20 percent of New Orleans that lives
below the $20,000 per year household poverty threshold. Reed’s point is well taken:
white or black, young or old, those hit hardest by the storm were those least able to
withstand it: the poorest members of the community.
The Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) bears out this view. It reports that
about one-fifth of the population directly affected by Hurricane Katrina was poor, 30% of
the most impacted population had incomes below one-and-a-half times the federal
poverty line, and 40% had incomes below twice the poverty line (CRS, 2005). Stivers
(2007) notes the disproportionate toll the storm took on those least capable of
withstanding it: five of the six areas hardest hit by the storm were predominantly black
“project neighborhoods,” with poverty rates in the 60% - 80% range, unemployment over
20%, and where 80% of the population were renters. Citing “structural racism,” Cigler
(2007) notes that evacuation plans ignored those who did not own automobiles, and/or
did not have the funds for an airline ticket or even bus fare. She points out that the
poorest residents could not afford to “ride out” the storm in a hotel, or the funds to
survive without work after the storm. In short, she argues, “Poor minorities had decreased
ability to cope during the disaster, and after, they had less access to government services
that could speed recovery” (p. 67).
If there is one word to describe the risk communication environment in New
Orleans, it is “complexity.” It is a diverse community, rich with ethnic history, yet
plagued with persistent poverty at the base of its social structure. As discussed in this
literature review, research conducted within the theoretical frameworks of Media System
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Dependency (MSD) and Uses and Gratifications (U&G) seems particularly well-suited to
explore risk communication in this environment, for both of these perspectives recognize
the role that personal, interpersonal, organizational, social, and cultural variables play in
the communication process.
In a city where Blacks constitute the ethnic majority, and count their history in the
community not in years or decades, but in generations and centuries, a study that seeks to
provide meaningful and useful insights into risk communication must take into account
the structures and relationships in the Black community. As noted in this review of the
literature, trust is a vital component in the risk communication process. Trustworthiness
in a source of risk communication messages, experienced over time, becomes confidence
(Renn & Levine, 1991). That confidence can serve as a motivating factor when
individuals seek out reliable sources for risk communication messages when disaster
looms, as was the case when Hurricane Katrina was bearing down on New Orleans. As
noted, research conducted in the MSD perspective has shown that the level of trust in
sources is a reliable predictor of media system dependency, and people who have higher
levels of trust in government are more likely to depend on media sources for risk
messages (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976). How do these relationships play out in New
Orleans, sitting, as it does, below sea level at the mouth of the Mississippi, where storms
hit hard and floods rise high? Over many decades, as hurricanes and floods approached,
officials have directed, even ordered, Blacks in this region to act in ways that put their
lives and property in harm’s way. They have been forced to shore up levees as a storm
approached, and then made to live on top of those levees while the storm raged [Ducre,
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2008]. The levees that protected their communities have been intentionally breached, so
that the flood waters would inundate their neighborhoods and spare their White neighbors
[Brinkley, 2006; Ducre, 2008]. When they sought food as their neighborhoods were
flooded by Katrina, they were branded as looters, while their White neighbors doing the
same thing were lauded as survivors [Dyson, 2005]. When they tried to escape the
Katrina floods on foot, they were stopped on the Danziger Bridge that led out of the
Black community to a White one, where they were held at gunpoint for days without
food, water or shelter. Some of them died of natural causes (Stein & Press, 2008), while
police shot and killed others, who were unarmed, and then tried to cover it up
(Huffington Post, September 22, 2010). With such a history, filled with repeated
betrayals of trust by officials over a long period of time, it would seem unlikely that the
Black community would have developed sufficient confidence in officials to trust their
messages when natural disasters loom. To whom do people in the Black community of
New Orleans turn for risk messages? Whom do they trust, and whom do they not trust?
This study seeks answers to those questions.
But despite its importance, race alone cannot provide the key to the puzzle that is
risk communication in New Orleans. Class must also be considered. There is a persistent
underclass in New Orleans, with some 20 percent of the population living below the
federal poverty level. Although the racial makeup of that underclass has shifted
somewhat with events such as Katrina, its size remains relatively constant. As Elliot and
Pais (2006) note, people in this underclass were nearly three times more likely to want to
remain in their homes and ride out the storm than those in any other socioeconomic class,
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a finding which, from a message-processing viewpoint, is consistent with that of Trumbo
(2008), who found heuristic processing (associated with trust of local sources and distrust
of official sources) associated with judgment of lower risk. Because of their economic
situation, they have fewer options and resources available to help them contend with
natural disasters (Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien, 1970; Beaudoin, 2008), and as a result
they bear a disproportionate level of the suffering that comes from those events (CRS,
2005). As noted, many people in this underclass decided to remain in their homes and
“ride out” Katrina. Many of them paid for that decision with their lives. Again, this study
asks, to whom do people in the underclass of New Orleans turn for risk messages? Whom
do they trust, and whom do they not trust? This study seeks answers to those questions.
The perspectives of U&G and MSD can be helpful in providing a theoretical
framework to understand this communication environment. As discussed above, BallRokeach (1998) noted that while both theories postulate active audiences, they view them
from different perspectives, with MSD seeing them as constrained by social forces, while
U&G focuses more on individual processing of messages. The bridge between them is
formed over the river of variables that influence the processing of risk messages,
variables that reflect, as Kasperson (1992) notes, the “psychological, social, institutional,
and cultural processes” that influence how people process those messages. The HeuristicSystematic Model (HSM) offers an effective vehicle for quantifying those variables and
charting the flow of risk communication.
As noted above, Katz (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 2006) viewed his development of the
limited effects paradigm with Lazarsfeld as a bridge between the direct effects paradigm,
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which focuses on the message creator, and U&G theory, which focuses on what the
message recipient does with the message. Leventhal et al (1983) sought to integrate the
Health Belief Model and the Fear Drive Model in forming the Parallel Process Model, in
order to place the research focus more clearly on the receiver. In like manner, this study
seeks to integrate MSD, which views audiences as more constrained and socially
determined, with U&G, which is more concerned with the individual’s use of media
messages to meet personal needs (Ball-Rokeach, 1998), and to express that new
perspective within the HSM. It seeks to analyze the complex risk communication
environment in New Orleans, and to suggest ways of constructing effective risk message
campaigns there, and in similarly diverse communities in other regions.

Structure of the Study
New Orleans is a unique and diverse community, one in which race, class and
poverty have played significant roles throughout its history. Although it is one of the
most vibrant cities in the United States, New Orleans is also one of the most
environmentally fragile, perched at the mouth of the Mississippi River on the Gulf of
Mexico, a position Douglas Brinkley likened to “a delicate saucer floating in a bowl of
water” (Brinkley, 2006). It has been battered by storms and floods for generations, and
now the impact of those “natural disasters” appears to be amplified by the effects of an
overheated planet.
This is a study of risk communication in Post-Katrina New Orleans. Post-Katrina
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New Orleans is something akin to post-September 11 New York City – the events are
over, but neither city will ever be the same. Some 3,000 people died in 2001 in the horror
of 9/11, most of them instantaneously. More than 1,800 people died during Hurricane
Katrina and the resultant flooding in 2005, but most likely few of those deaths were
instantaneous. That raises the possibility that at least some of them were preventable.
That possibility is the inspiration for this study – to make a meaningful contribution to
the development of more effective risk management campaigns in communities exposed
to natural disasters.
The main focus of the study is on risk communication about dangerous
environmental events in post-Katrina New Orleans, and the influence that race and class
have on that process. This study seeks to determine the assessment of New Orleans
residents of the various possible sources of risk information that are available to them,
and how race and socioeconomic class affect their level of trust in those sources. The
importance of race in the risk communication process of a city that was more than 67%
Black in 2005 is readily apparent (Brinkley, 2006; Troutt, 2006; Beaudoin, 2008; U.S.
Census, 2010). Connections between and among race, class, poverty and the ability to
respond to natural disasters have been established in previous studies (Tichenor,
Donohue, & Olien, 1970; Perry & Mushkatel, 1984; Morrow, 2000; Congressional
Research Service, 2005; Elliot & Pais, 2006; Cigler, 2007; Stivers, 2007). Hence, this
study broadly asks:
RQ1: Do Black and White audiences assess risk messages differently?
RQ2: Do people of different socioeconomic classes assess risk messages differently?
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The two research questions look at the influence of race (Hypotheses #1-#4) and
socioeconomic class (Hypotheses #4-#8) on the assessment of risk messages from four
sources: mass media outlets, national leaders and spokespersons, local community leaders
and spokespersons, and interpersonal communication. Previous research has found that
Whites ranked mass media first among their choices for risk messages, while Blacks
preferred local officials (Perry & Mushkatel, 1984), a finding supported by Guion,
Scammon & Borders (2007). Morrow (2000) found that minorities relied more on “kin
and social networks” for risk message information. Therefore, Hypothesis #1 states:
H1: Black residents trust mass media outlets less as a source for risk messages
than White residents do.
In a national study of trust in sources, Louisiana had the third-lowest index of
generalized trust, ahead only of two other Gulf Coast states, Mississippi and Alabama.
This low trust index was found to be connected to lower levels of trust in government by
Blacks (Uslaner, 2004). Both Miller (1974) and Hetherington (1998) found that Blacks
showed significantly less trust in national government than did Whites. Therefore,
Hypothesis #2 states,
H2: Black residents trust national leaders and spokespersons less as a source for
risk messages than White residents do.
In previous studies, Blacks have consistently expressed higher levels of trust in
local authorities as sources of risk messages (Perry & Mushkatel, 1984; Fessenden-Raden
et al., 1987; Guion, Scammon & Borders, 2007). The NRC (1984) notes the need to
utilize local community leaders as transmitters and sources of risk information where
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“widespread mistrust of public sources of information exists,” a mistrust that has been
identified as present to a high degree in New Orleans, due to its long and sorry history of
inadequate and often harmful official responses to hurricanes and floods (Brinkley, 2006;
Dyson, 2006; Ducre, 2008). Therefore, Hypothesis #3 states,
H3: Black residents trust local community leaders and spokespersons more as a
source for risk messages than White residents do.
As the NRC (1984) notes, where mistrust of official sources exists, people look
for “different information channels.” Research has shown that source credibility is twice
as important for Blacks than Whites in their assessment of risk messages (Perry &
Mushkatel, 1984). Morrow (2000) found that minorities were more likely to rely on
relatives and social networks as sources for risk information. The influence of social trust
on communication has been established (Fessenden-Raden, Fitchen & Heath; 1987; Earle
& Cvetkovich, 1999), and in a community such as New Orleans, where interpersonal
relationships extend to many generations, it is reasonable to expect that social trust plays
a significant role in risk communication. Therefore, Hypothesis #4 states,
H4: Black residents trust interpersonal communication more as a source for risk
messages than White residents do.
Katrina had its greatest impact on the poor (Congressional Research Service,
2005; Elliot & Pais, 2006; Cigler, 2007; Stivers, 2007), who are the least able to take
protective action in the face of an oncoming environmental threat, due to lack of
resources (Perry & Mushkatel, 1984). The 5% of the population of New Orleans that
“rode out the storm” and took the brunt of its fury was almost exclusively Black (Elliot &
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Pais, 2006). About 20% of New Orleans residents have incomes below the federal
poverty threshold (U.S. Census, 2004, 2009). In addition, researchers have found the
existence of a “knowledge gap” between people of different socioeconomic classes, one
in which people of higher socioeconomic status acquire information from the mass media
at a much faster rate than those of lower socioeconomic status (Tichenor, Donohue &
Olien, 1970). Therefore, Hypothesis #5 states,
H5: The lower the socioeconomic class, the lower the trust in mass media outlets
as a source for risk messages.
In a national study, Uslaner (2004) found that the level of generalized trust,
independent of race, was positively correlated with higher levels of trust in government.
As noted, Louisiana ranked 48th out of the 50 states in generalized trust. With what
appears to be a hardcore poverty base of some 20% of the New Orleans population (U.S.
Census, 2004, 2009), it is reasonable to expect that the generalized level of trust in
national leaders within that community would be low. Therefore, Hypothesis #6 states,
H6: The lower the socioeconomic class, the lower the trust in national leaders and
spokespersons as a source for risk messages.
A higher level of trust in community leaders could be expected in a city such as
New Orleans, which is bound together in social trust that is both pluralistic and
cosmopolitan (Earl & Cvetkovich, 1999). Blacks made up more than two-thirds of the
population of New Orleans when Katrina struck (U.S. Census, 2004). One-fifth of the
population most impacted by Katrina was poor (Congressional Research Service, 2005),
and five of the six hardest-hit areas were predominantly Black housing projects, with
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poverty rates in the 60%-80% range (Stivers, 2007). It is reasonable to expect that since
the lower socioeconomic class that makes up such a large part of the population is
predominately Black, that it would reflect a similar preference for local community
leaders and spokespersons as might be found in the Black population. But while race and
class in New Orleans seem to be intertwined, they are not inextricable. Computer analysis
of the survey data in SPSS allows for control for race and class, by isolating each, so their
effects the risk communication process can be measured independently. Therefore,
Hypothesis #7 and Hypothesis #8 state,
H7: The lower the socioeconomic class, the higher the trust in local community
leaders and spokespersons as a source for risk messages.
H8: The lower the socioeconomic class, the higher the trust in interpersonal
communication as a source for risk messages.
In the design of the telephone survey to gather the data (explained in greater detail
in the Methods chapter that follows), eight possible sources of risk information were
identified, and respondents were asked about their level of trust in each. In an effort to
increase the richness of the data obtained, questions were also asked about Internet
sources. For purposes of analysis and discussion, the eight sources were divided by type
into three groups, as follows: mass media (newspapers, local radio news, local TV news);
Internet sources (non-news websites, social media sites), and people (national leaders and
spokespersons, community leaders and spokespersons, and interpersonal
communication).
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Since this study is concerned with how people assess risk information from a
variety of sources, including media, it was informed by previous research in Media
System Dependency (“MSD”) and Uses and Gratifications (“U&G”). MSD researchers
have established the connection between times of stress and change and reliance on
media (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976; Loges,1994; Beaudoin, 2008) and official
sources of information (Whaley and Tucker, 2004). U&G research has focused more on
the relationship of the individual to the message (Ball-Rokeach, 1998), and particularly
emphasized the dynamic nature of the communication process, where the message
recipient is an active communicator, not a passive recipient of the message (Rubin, 2002).
Both of these theoretical perspectives informed this study, and influenced the design and
construction of the research questions, hypotheses, and the survey instrument used to
gather the data.
The study of the phenomenon of trust is relatively new, particularly that of trust in
media. The concepts of trust and credibility are intertwined, as evidenced in the definition
of the terms themselves. For someone or something to be credible, it must be
“believable” or “reliable,” while trust is defined as a “firm belief or confidence in the
honesty, integrity, reliability” (Agnes, 2002). Renn and Levine (1991) echo that
definition in describing trust in communication as an expectation in the message recipient
that the information is “true and reliable” (ibid., p. 179). Hovland and Weiss (1951)
focused on two elements of source credibility: perceived expertness and trustworthiness,
and found that “trustworthiness of the source” and opinion change in the message
recipient are significantly related (ibid., p. 647). The National Research Council (1989)
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sees “credibility” as used in communication research as an attribute of a communication
source that is a combination of perception of source expertise and degree of trust in that
source by the message recipient (ibid., p. 24). Researchers have identified trust as the
individual expression of source reliability (Kasperson, Golding, & Tuler, 1992; Siegrist,
Cvetkovich, & Roth, 2000).
As noted above, researchers have sited risk communication in the social context
in which it occurs (Fessenden-Raden, Ritchen, & Heath, 1987; Renn & Levine, 1991;
Renn, 1992; Kasperson, Golding, & Tuler, 1992; Earle & Cvetkovich, 1999; Siegrist,
Cvetkovich, & Roth, 2000), and identified the important role that “relationships of trust”
play in the risk communication process (Rayner, 1992). Following Laswell and Katz
(1955), Kasperson (1992) notes the role of individuals functioning as “amplification
stations” in a risk communication process that occurs in a socio-cultural context (ibid., p.
159). For more than a half-century researchers have explored the influence of source
credibility on communication, and found trust to be an essential component (Hovland &
Weiss, 1951; McComas & Trumbo, 2001).
The path of research into trust in information sources, beginning with Roper in
1985, has yielded a progressive improvement in the obtaining of quantifiable data
regarding levels of trust in various sources. Risk communication researchers have looked
to research in psychology for models that can analyze and express that quantifiable data
with validity, and allow for further testing to ensure its reliability. Message
communication models have grown from their beginnings in the Fear Appeal Model
(Janis & Feshbach, 1953; White, Meyer, & Martell, 2001; Witte et al., 2001), to the more
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positive perspective of the Health Belief Model (Rosenstock, 1974; Janz & Becker,
1984), and into efforts toward quantifying data, including the Parallel Processing Models
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Leventhal, 1983; Ajzen, 1985), which provided mapping of
message processing pathways. Observing what they perceived as an inequity in the two
processing pathways postulated in the parallel models, Eagly and Chaiken (1993)
developed the Heuristic-Systematic Model (“HSM”), which for the first time offered
researchers a fully quantifiable model in which to explore the issues of message
processing and assessment.
This study follows Trumbo and McComas (2008), who cite Earle and Cvetkovich
(1999) in arguing that “we allow for the expression of trust as a native concept amenable
to measurement by a single item” (Trumbo and McComas, 2008, p. 63). It seeks to
follow previous research by utilizing a Likert-based semantic differential scale to
measure four components of trust: accuracy, fairness, completeness, and impartiality,
following Roper (1985), Gaziano and McGrath (1986), Meyer, (1988), and Trumbo and
McComas (2003, 2008).
Interviewers can ask respondents demographic questions about race, income,
education and other aspects of their lives that help create a picture of the individual.
Those questions have been asked by interviewers for the U.S. Census for decades. They
can also ask questions about trust in various sources of media, as Roper and others have
done. But the challenge for risk communication researchers is to take the demographic
data and answers to questions of trust and to quantify and analyze them in a meaningful
way.
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The volume of risk communication literature is growing exponentially, but much
of it is focused on health communication. The body of work in trust in media is also
growing, while the Internet expands exponentially, reaching more than one-third of the
world’s population, a growth of more than 566% in just twelve years
(internetworldstats.com, 2012). This study extends the exploration of sources of risk
communication to those found on the Internet. It was constructed in an effort to
synthesize the latest research in risk communication and trust in a study of post-Katrina
New Orleans that can inform the development of future risk communication campaigns
through implementation of quantifiable models such as HSM.
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CHAPTER 3
Methods
As noted above, this study follows a path established by previous researchers,
particularly those who explored the concept of trust in media sources (Roper, 1985;
Gaziano and McGrath, 1986; Meyer, 1988; Trumbo and McComas, 2003, 2008). The
survey instrument for this study was constructed on the foundations laid by these
researchers, which started with the “Roper Question,” and was adapted to risk
communication in a study of cancer clusters by Trumbo and McComas (2008). I
eliminated the fifth question asked by Trumbo and McComas about each risk
communication source (trust/don’t trust), to avoid conflation, a decision that was
consistent with the approach taken by Trumbo (C. Trumbo, personal communication,
October 24, 2012).
Although this study has a different focus in risk communication (race and class),
the Likert Scale question construction lends itself particularly well to the development of
indices of trust and socioeconomic class. The compact structure of the survey format,
refined and tested over time, was particularly well-suited to telephone survey
methodology, which has the additional benefit of time and cost efficiency (Patten, 2001).
I chose the Public Policy Research Lab at Louisiana State University to conduct the
survey because of their experience in conducting similar surveys for a wide range of
clients, and in particular, conducting telephone surveys in the New Orleans area.
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Telephone Survey
The concentrated focus of this study on the influence of race and class on the
trustworthiness of sources for risk messages allows for the necessary data to be collected
in a telephone survey instrument in which respondents evaluate eight (8) possible sources
of risk information by rating each on a semantic differential scale for accuracy, fairness,
completeness, and impartiality (See Appendix 1 –Telephone Survey Questions). The
eight sources are grouped as follows:
I. Mass Media
1) Local newspapers
2) Radio news
3) Local television news

II. Internet-based communications
4) Computer websites other than news sites
5) Social media sites

III. People
6) National leaders and spokespersons
7) local community leaders and spokespersons
8) Family and friends
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The survey questions relate directly to the two research questions and eight
hypotheses, four for each research question. As noted above, the question form follows
Roper (1985), Gaziano and McGrath (1986), Meyer, (1988), and Trumbo and McComas
(2003, 2008). I asked four questions on each possible source of risk information:
1) accurate/inaccurate; 2) fair/unfair; 3) tells the whole story/doesn’t tell the whole story;
and
4) biased/unbiased.

Answers to each question were entered on a five-point Likert scale, numbered 1-5
on a continuum bounded by the polar opposite answers, e.g., “How would you rate local
newspapers, where 1 means ‘inaccurate’ and 5 means ‘accurate’?” – with the additional
choices of “don’t know (8)” and “refused” (9) for each question. The data from these
responses were used to create indices of trustworthiness for each of the potential sources
of risk information.
After the respondents rated the eight sources, they were asked five demographic
questions: 1) Age; 2) Gender; 3) Household Income; 4) Education; and 5) Race. The age
categories (18-24; 25-34; 35-44; 45-64; 65 and over) were developed by modifying the
U.S. Census categories as reported in the U.S. American Factifinder (U.S. Census, 2009).
These modifications were done in accordance with survey guidelines presented by Patten
(2001). A minimum age of 18 was selected for respondents. The 5-year increments used
in the census were paired to create 10-year increments for this study. The top ranges of
the census were combined in one age range, “65 and over,” to create a category

87

beginning with the typical retirement age in the U.S. The gender questions (male; female)
follows Fowler (1995).
The household income categories (Less, than $10,000; $10,000-$21,199;
$22,000-$34,999; $35,000-$49,999; $50,000- $74,999; $75,000-$99,999; $100,000 or
more) were developed by modifying the U.S. Census income categories in accordance
with the guidelines of Patten (2001) to meet the parameters of this study. Category “b”
was given an upper limit of $21,199, as $21,200 is the established federal poverty
threshold for a family of four, as noted above.
The wording of the education question (“What is the highest grade or year of
school you have completed?”) is taken from Fowler’s “Improving Survey Questions
(1995). The categories (elementary, 0-8 years; some high school, 1-3 years; high school
graduate, 4 years; some college, 1-3 years; college graduate, 4 or more years) are taken
from Patten’s Questionnaire Research (2001), which is based on the U.S. Census
Bureau’s categories.
Fowler (1995) identifies three indicators of socioeconomic status: income,
educational attainment, and occupation (p. 171). He notes that each has its “limitations,
often very severe limitations, for capturing what researchers are truly after” (p.171). He
notes that, “Educational attainment is probably the most generally useful and
interpretable measure of the three” (p. 171). He notes that although income “would seem
likely to be the best, most direct measure of resources or financial well-being” (p.172), it
is tempered by three elements: 1) personal income as a part of household income; 2)
availability of assets; and 3) financial obligations. He finds occupation the most
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“complicated” and a “probably less useful way” to measure socioeconomic status (p.
172). He also notes that seeking useful data on occupation requires the asking of at least
three questions, after which a complex coding process must occur. Since the focus of this
study is on trust, and the resources of time and finance are relatively limited, it was
decided to use the first two of Fowler’s socioeconomic indicators, i.e., income and
educational attainment, for this study. It should further be noted that Fowler does not
argue for the use of all three indicators together. Rather, he says that “indicators of
socioeconomic status include” [emphasis mine] these three measures.
The categories for race (Asian; Black or African American; White/Caucasian;
Hispanic; Native American; some other race alone; two or more races; Other) represent a
hybrid of the U.S. Census categories and the guidelines recommended by Patten (2001),
The nature of the questionnaire developed to acquire this data is well-suited to
the telephone survey format (Frey, 1983). An individual survey questionnaire can be
completed in less than 15 minutes, is significantly more cost-effective than an in-person
survey, and requires less processing time than either an in-person or mail survey. As
such, it fits within the budgetary and time constraints of this study. As noted above, the
survey questionnaire follows the risk communication survey instrument development
work of Roper (1985), Gaziano and McGrath (1986), Meyer, (1988), and Trumbo and
McComas (2003, 2008).
A survey of telephone numbers in Orleans Parish was conducted for this study by
the Public Policy Research Lab of Louisiana State University, using the random digit
dialing method (Frey, 1983). The survey was conducted from June 18, 2012 through July
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24, 2012, and included both landlines and cell phones. Interviewers asked a screening
question to ensure that they were speaking to the head of the household. The final data set
of completed interviews (n = 414) includes 278 respondents were contacted on landlines,
and 136 who were contacted on cell phones.
A complete description of the survey methodology employed by The Public
Policy Lab is included in this study (see Appendix 2). As noted therein, data were
weighted to match 2010 U.S. Census population estimates for Orleans Parish. Missing
values for income, resulting from respondents’ reluctance to disclose personal financial
information, were inputted based on the education, age, race and gender of the
respondent. In the un-weighted data on the respondents, there were 125 males and 268
females. In the question on race, 219 self-identified as Black, 134 as White, and 29 as
Other (respondents indicating other than Black or White). The average respondent was a
high-school graduate (M = 3.81, SD = 1.08), with an average income in the $35,000 $49,999 range (M = 4.32, SD = 1.82). The complete demographic percentages are
presented in Table II below.
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Table II:
Un-weighted, Weighted and Census Estimates for Selected Demographics
Un-weighted

Weighted

Census

Gender
Male
Female

31.9%
68.1%

48.5%
51.5%

48.6%
51.4%

Race
White/Caucasian
Black/African-American
Other

34.7%
57.1%
8.2%

36.7%
54.6%
8.7%

33.0%
60.2%
6.8%

Education
Less than High School

6.9%

14.7%

16.6%

High School
Some College
College

19.3%
28.9%
45.0%

24.2%
26.3%
34.9%

26.9%
24.9%
31.6%

Age
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-64
65 and over

2.7%
11.9%
12.6%
41.0%
31.9%

12.8%
20.0%
17.6%
34.5%
15.2%

16.0%
19.0%
16.7%
34.0%
14.3%

Income
Less than $10,000
$10,000 - $34,999
$35,000 - $49,999
$50,000 - $74,999
$75,000 - $99,999
$100,000 or more

12.6%
33.8%
15.2%
18.1%
7.5%
12.8%

9.8%
36.4%
14.8%
13.8%
9.0%
16.3%

13.9%
33.6%
13.5%
15.3%
8.5%
15.2%

The overall margin of error for the survey is +/- 4.8 % at a 95% confidence interval. This
is consistent with accepted practice in statistical social science research, as Patten notes
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that approximately 400 surveys would need to be completed in order to achieve a +/- 5%
margin of error at the 95% confidence level (Patten, 2001; Creative Research Systems,
2010). In addition, Triola (1992) notes that among the common choices for the degree of
confidence (90%, 95% and 99%), the 95% confidence level is “most common,” because
“it seems to represent a good balance between precision (as reflected in the width of the
confidence interval) and reliability (as expressed by the degree of confidence)” (p. 284).
Another consideration is cost: nearly twice the number of completed surveys is required
to obtain a 99% confidence level as compared to the 95% level.
The question of landline vs. cell phone polling has grown in importance with the
increased use of cell phones. The Pew Research Center reports that as of June 2010 some
24.9% of all adults in the U.S. use only cell phones, and among Blacks it is 28.9% (Pew,
methodology/collecting-survey-data/cell-phone-surveys, 2012). The U.S. National Health
Interview Survey of the Centers for Disease Control puts the figure for cell-phone only
households at 34% (Blumberg & Luke, 2012).
Sampling cell phone users presents a unique set of problems, which are magnified
when sampling a small geographic area, such as Orleans Parish. Among those problems
identified by the Pew Research Center are the portability of numbers, the association of
the number with the originally issuing provider (and the provider’s location) rather than
the user, mixed or shared cell and landline numbers, difficulty of identifying the caller,
and call forwarding (Pew, methodology/sampling/cell-phones, 2012). Also, adding cell
phones to a survey results in higher costs as compared to a landline-only survey, with
some estimates ranging as high as one and a half to two times greater, due in part to 95
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59higher data processing and weighting costs (Pew, methodology/collecting-surveydata/cell-phone-surveys, 2012). Additional factors such as caller ID on cell phones, the
variable influence of the environment where the call is received on freedom to talk,
dropped calls, charges for minutes used, and the possibility of needing to offer cash
payments for participation must be considered when considering the inclusion of cell
phones in a telephone survey.
However, when nearly one-third of a key demographic component of a target
population uses only cell phones, such as in this study, every effort must be expended to
ensure that the subject population is properly represented in the sample. Fortunately,
because of their familiarity with this market, having conducted many telephone research
studies in New Orleans, the LSU Public Policy Research Lab was able to produce a
survey that includes both landlines and cell phone users at a cost within the budgetary
limitations of this study.

Data Analysis
SPSS software was utilized to analyze the data. Missing variables resulting from
“don’t know (-8)” or “refused (-9)” responses were accounted for in SPSS for all
variables, and missing values were excluded pairwise in calculations. I performed an
Analysis of Covariance (“ANCOVA”) on the data to test the four hypotheses of the first
research question, which explores the influence of race (a nominal independent variable)
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on the trustworthiness (a continuous dependent variable) of eight sources of risk
messages in three groups: mass media outlets, Internet sources, and people, while
controlling for socioeconomic status (“SES”), and selecting for Blacks and Whites only.
In order to measure trust, I created an additive index variable for each media source by
aggregating the mean scores of the total responses to the questions on each of the four
elements of trust on each source, consistent with previous research (Trumbo and
McComas, 2003, 2008; C. Trumbo, personal communication, October 24, 2012).
I ran Cronbach’s alpha test on all eight trust indices combined (and
individually, as follows: trust newspapers (= .74); trust local radio news (= .75), trust
local television news (=.71), trust non-news websites (= .76), trust social media (=
.76), trust national leaders (= .74), trust community leaders (= .75), and trust
interpersonal communication (= .74).
The second research question explores the influence of socioeconomic class on
the assessment of risk messages. I aggregated the scores of the responses to the questions
on income and education in order to create a index variable (“SEI”) for socioeconomic
status (“SES”) (Fowler, 1995), in a procedure utilized by Trumbo (2012) and noted by
Blishen, Carroll & Moore (1987):
The investigator may collect or have access to data on status attributes such as
(a) education, in number of years of school completed, (b) gross family income,
(c) occupation of main earner, and (d) ethnic group. The first three of these,
or the first and either of the second two [emphasis mine], may be given
scores on comparable (standardized) scales and then combined to form a
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composite score of socioeconomic status (p. 816).

There were seven categories of income in the questionnaire, and the five
categories of education were reduced to four by combining “elementary (0-8)” and “some
high school (1-3)” into a single category, “less than high school” (see Appendix 1,
“Telephone Survey Questions”), yielding eleven categories in the resultant SEI variable
(M = 6.92, SD = 2.66). I ran Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient tests on
the SEI variable and the eight sources of risk messages, once again filtering for Blacks
and Whites only.
In order to explore the relationships between frequency of use and trust in
sources, I ran Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient tests on the variables
for frequency of use of each of the eight sources with the trust indices for each of them,
filtering for the responses of Blacks and Whites only. I performed a Cronbach’s alpha test
on the reliability of the SEI index variable (= .77), together with the eight trust indices
noted above (= .71).
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Chapter 4
Results
To test the four hypotheses of the first research question - “Do Black and White
audiences assess risk messages differently?” - Analysis of Covariance (“ANCOVA”)
tests were run on the trust indices for the eight sources of risk messages, divided into
three categories:
I. Mass media outlets:
1) newspapers
2) radio news
3) local TV news
II. Internet sites:
4) “websites other than news sites” (to differentiate non-news websites from those
maintained
by mass media outlets such as newspapers, radio and TV)
5) “social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter”
III. People
6) national leaders and spokespersons
7) community leaders and spokespersons
8) interpersonal communication
The Independent Variable (IV) was Race, filtered for Blacks and Whites only,
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and the Dependent Variable in each test was the trust index for the specific source,
while controlling for socioeconomic status (“SES”) with the “SEI” variable, an index
variable created with the aggregate score of Income and Education, as detailed in the
Methods section above. Results for the eight sources are reported in Table III below:
Table III:
ANCOVA Results: Differences by race in risk message assessment,
controlling for socioeconomic status
_________________________________________________________________________
Blacks
Whites
__________
________
Trust
M
SD
M
SD
F
df
ηp2
p
_________________________________________________________________________
Newspapers
3.58 0.92
3.75 0.87
4.56
1,327
.01
.033*
Radio news

3.59

0.95

3.73

0.89

8.87

1,303

.03

.003**

Local TV news

3.71 0.95

3.79

0.80

3.89

1,357

.01

.049*

Non-news Websites

3.64

0.95

3.39

1.20

0.11

1,280

. 00

.743

Social Media

2.79

1.06

2.19

0.92

2.14

1,233

.01

.145

National Leaders

2.97

1.06

2.71

0.96

2.30

1,352

.01

.130

Community Leaders

2.86

1.09

3.23

0.91

19.26

1,342

.05

.000***

Interpersonal
3.02 1.06 3.44 0.95
20.40 1,355
.05
.000***
__________________________________________________________________________
*p < .05; **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Note: M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation. Trust in each outlet is an index variable created by
aggregating the means of answers on a Likert Scale (1-5) to four questions, where “1” is the
least and “5” is the most: accurate/accurate; fair/unfair; doesn’t tell the whole story/tells the
whole story; biased/unbiased (See Appendix 1 – Telephone Survey Questions).

Hypothesis #1, “Black residents trust mass media outlets less as a source for risk
messages than White residents do,” is supported, with the ANCOVA showing that after
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controlling for SES, Blacks had significantly less trust than Whites in the three mass
media sources: newspapers F(1,327) = 4.56, p = .033, ηp2 = .01; radio news F(1,303) =
8.87, p = .003,
ηp2 = .03, and Local TV news F(1.357) = 3.89, p = .049, ηp2 = .01. In the use of Internet
sites, there was no statistically significant difference between Blacks and Whites in their
trust of non-news websites and social media sites as sources of risk messages.
In the three hypotheses testing trust in people as sources, Hypotheses #2, “Black
residents trust national leaders and spokespersons less as a source for risk messages
than White residents do,” was not supported, as there was no statistically significant
difference found between Blacks and Whites. But Hypothesis #3, “Black residents trust
local community leaders and spokespersons more as a source for risk messages than
White residents do,” was not only not supported, but the existence of an obverse
relationship was indicated, with Blacks showing significantly less trust in local
community leaders and spokespersons than Whites did after controlling for SES: F(1,
342) = 19.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .05. In similar fashion, Hypothesis #4, “Black residents
trust interpersonal communication more as a source for risk messages than White
residents do,” was not supported, and the existence of an obverse relationship was
indicated, as Whites showed more trust in interpersonal communication than Blacks did,
after controlling for SES: F(1, 355) = 20.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .05.
Research Question #2 asks, “Do people of different socioeconomic classes assess
risk messages differently?” Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient tests were
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performed between the SES index variable and the trust indices for the eight sources of
risk messages, filtered for Blacks and Whites only. Results are listed in Table IV below:
Table IV:
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for SES and Indices of Trust – Blacks and Whites
___________________________________________________________________________
Trust
___________________
Non-news Social Nat’l.
Com. Interpersonal
Newspaper Radio
TV websites Media Lead.
Lead.
Com.
___________________________________________________________________________
SES
-.002
-.097 -.103* -.181** -.368*** -.085
-.030
.008
___________________________________________________________________________
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
None of Hypotheses #5-#8 is supported. But once again, several obverse
relationships are indicated. The test of Hypothesis #5, “The lower the socioeconomic
class, the lower the trust in mass media outlets as a source for risk messages,” reveals
that of the three mass media outlets (newspapers, radio and TV) tested, socioeconomic
class had a significant relationship with one, trust in Local TV news, Pearson’s r(364) =
-.103, p = .049. The correlation was negative, indicating that as SES increases, trust in
Local TV news decreases. No significant correlations were found between SES and trust
in local leaders and spokespersons, national leaders and spokesperson, or interpersonal
communication. Therefore, Hypotheses #6, #7 and #8 are not supported.
In the second group of sources, Internet sites, significant negative correlations
were observed between SES and trust in non-news websites, Pearson’s r(282) = -.181, p
= .002, and social media sites, Pearson’s r(236) = -.37, p < .001, once again indicating
that as SES increases, trust in Internet sources of risk messages decreases.
In a search for further clarity, I next explored the relationship between media use
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and trust in media by running Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient tests on
frequency of use of a particular medium and trust in that medium, once again filtering
for Blacks and Whites only. As might be expected, the frequency of use of a mass
medium was positively correlated with trust as a source for risk messages for
newspapers, Pearson’s r(335) = .248,
p < .001, local radio news, Pearson’s r(307) = .130, p = .022, and local TV news,
Pearson’s r(366) = .367, p < .001. These positive correlations were also observed in use
of Internet sites, with frequency of use and trust indices positively correlated for nonnews websites, Pearson’s r(282) = .237, p < .001, and social media sites, such as
Facebook and Twitter, Pearson’s r(235) = .403, p < .001.
Further exploration of the relationship between frequency of use of a particular
medium and trust in the third risk message category, people, revealed that frequency of
newspaper use was positively correlated with trust in interpersonal communication,
Pearson’s r(364) = .234,
p < .001. Frequency of listening to local radio news was positively correlated to trust in
national leaders, Pearson’s r(359) = .204, p < .001, and also to trust in interpersonal
communication Pearson’s r(362) = .196, p < .001. In a particularly interesting finding,
frequency of viewing local television news was positively correlated to all three source
elements in the “people” category, national leaders Pearson’s r(361) = .224, p < .001,
local community leaders Pearson’s r(352) = .146, p = .006, and interpersonal
communication Pearson’s r(365) = .144, p = .006.
Exploration of the use of Internet-based sources of risk messages revealed a
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significant negative relationship between the frequency of use of non-news websites and
trust in national leaders, Pearson’s r(358) = -.146, p = .006. However, there was a
significant positive relationship between frequency of use of social media sites and trust
in community leaders, Pearson’s r(343) = .130, p = .016, while there was a significant
negative relationship between social media sites and trust in interpersonal
communication Pearson’s r(355) = -.177, p = .001.
Finally, I explored the differences between Blacks and Whites in their frequency
of media use. An independent samples -test indicated that the frequency of use of
newspapers as a source of risk messages was significantly higher for Whites (M = 3.94,
SD = 1.34) than for Blacks (M = 3.38, SD = 1.65), t(368) = 3.46, p < .001. The
frequency of use of non-news websites as a source of risk messages was significantly
higher for Whites (M = 3.04,
SD = 1.55) than for Blacks (M = 3.00, SD = 1.71), t(365) = .215, p = .002. But the
frequency of use of social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter was significantly
higher for Blacks
(M = 2.45, SD = 1.69) than for Whites (M = 2.01, SD = 1.39), t(359) = -2.55, p < .001.

101

Chapter 5
Discussion
The first research question, “Do Black and White audiences assess risk messages
differently,” was constructed based upon well-established theory of differences between
races in the risk communication process (Miller, 1974; NRC, 1984; Perry and Mushkatel,
1984; Putnam, 1996; Hetherington, 1998; Morrow, 1999; Blumler and Gurevich, 2000;
Morrow, 2000; Guion, Scammon, and Borders, 2007; Beaudoin, 2008). Based on my
review of the literature, I expected the data to support the hypotheses of racial difference
in the assessment of risk messages throughout the range of sources tested. But after using
ANCOVA to test those racial differences of trust in each of the eight sources, after
controlling for SES (see Table III), I found statistically significant differences present in
five (newspapers, radio news, local TV news, community leaders, and interpersonal
communication), and not in three (non-news websites, social media, and national
leaders).
At first I was surprised by the variety of the results, and their apparent
inconsistency from one source to the next. But as my analysis progressed, I began to
realize that these results are consistent with and reflective of the population studied, i.e.,
the people of New Orleans Parish, as unique and diverse a population as there is to be
found anywhere in America. The perceptions of risk communication shared by the
respondents are complex and nuanced, just as their community is, and just as difficult to
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categorize, particularly in “Black and White” terms. But the data do reveal many
relationships of interest, worthy of discussion and suggestive of further study.
When considered as three distinct groups of risk message sources (mass media,
Internet sites, and people), the clearest racial difference in assessment came in mass
media, where Blacks showed significantly less trust than Whites in all three sources newspapers, local radio news, local TV news - a finding consistent with previous
research (Perry & Mushkatel, 1984; Guion, Scammon, and Borders, 2007). But taken as a
group, mass media was more trusted by both Blacks and Whites than the other two,
Internet sites and people (See Table III). This finding is consistent with those of a Pew
Research Center report (Pew, 2011), which found that, “…news organizations are more
trusted sources of information than are many other institutions, including government and
business” (p. 1).
As reported in the Results section, there was no statistically significant difference
between Blacks and Whites in trust in the second group of sources, Internet sites (nonnews websites and social media). When testing the third group of sources, people
(national leaders and spokespersons, community leaders, and interpersonal
communication), no statistically significant difference was found between Blacks and
Whites in their trust in national leaders and spokespersons, a finding that runs counter to
previous research (Miller, 1974; Heatherington, 1998). And Whites showed more trust
than Blacks did in community leaders and spokespersons, and also in interpersonal
communication. These findings would appear to run contrary to some previous studies,
particularly those with a focus on social trust (NRC, 1984; Fessenden-Raden, Fitchen and
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Heath, 1987; Earle and Cvetkovich, 1999).
Considering the history of race relations in Louisiana, particularly in regard to
hurricane response, it is understandable that researchers would seek to identify racial
differences in the communication of risk messages in an attempt to improve the
effectiveness of future risk messaging campaigns. Certainly, this study shares that same
goal. However, if race is not playing as significant a role in the risk communication
process as it has in the past, has class taken its place? I explored that premise in the
second research question of this study, “Do people of different socioeconomic classes
assess risk messages differently?”
Once again, the data suggest a risk communication process that is complex and
nuanced. Although none of the four hypotheses is supported, interesting relationships
emerge from the data (see Table IV). A negative correlation was found between SES and
trust in both Internet sources of risk communication (non-news websites and social
media). The relationship between SES and trust in non-news websites was in the weak
negative range (r < -.30), and that between SES and social media was in the moderate
negative range (-.30 < r < -.039). These findings suggest that as the SES of an individual
increases (improves), his/her trust in the Internet as a source of risk messages decreases.
That makes sense, given that the SES index used in this study and others represents an
aggregate score of education and income. Since one of the primary goals of education is
to foster critical and independent thinking, it stands to reason that the more education a
person has, and the higher the income that he/she receives (at least in part, if not largely)
as a result, the more skeptical he/she would be of any source of information, risk or
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otherwise. With the increase in Internet reach and use, this finding should be of concern
to risk communication practitioners, as they seek to design risk messaging campaigns that
utilize sources.
The finding in this study of a negative correlation between SES and trust in TV
news is consistent with recent reports on trust in mass media. Gallup (2010) reported
survey results that showed that, “For the fourth straight year, the majority of Americans
say they have little or no trust in the mass media to report the news fully, accurately, and
fairly. The 57% who now say this is a record high by one percentage point” (Gallup,
2010). A Pew Research Center survey on press accuracy found that, “The public’s
assessment of the accuracy of news stories is now at its lowest level in more than two
decades of Pew Research surveys,” and that, “Just 29% of Americans say that news
organizations generally get the facts straight, while 63% say that news stories are often
inaccurate” (Pew, 2009). Yet, as noted in the discussion above, there is encouraging news
for traditional media in this study, since they were they more trusted as a group as a
source of risk messages than were the other two groups, Internet sources and people.
The analyses of the relationship between frequency of use of a particular source
and trust in that and other sources yielded information that further illuminates the risk
communication process. As noted above, the positive correlation between frequency of
use of a medium and trust in that medium in both traditional media and Internet sources
was to be expected. But some of the other relationships revealed were not. Of particular
note, frequency of newspaper use and frequency of use of radio news were both
positively correlated with trust in interpersonal communication, and frequency of use of
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radio news was also positively correlated with trust in national leaders. Frequency of
television use was shown to be positively correlated with trust in all three sources in the
“people” category: national leaders, community leaders, and interpersonal
communication. Whites used newspapers and non-news websites more frequently than
Blacks as a risk communication source, while Blacks used social media sites more
frequently.
What conclusions can be drawn from this study? First, I believe the data indicate
that race is not as dominating a factor in the risk communication process as it once was,
or at least was thought to be, and that consideration of socioeconomic status must be
taken into consideration in the creation of effective risk messaging models. This study
does not stand alone in that perspective. Modern studies are progressively revealing the
increased role that SES plays in the risk communication process (Reed, 1998; Elliot and
Pais, 2006; Beaudoin, 2008; Morrow, 2000). This recognition is not confined to risk
communication, but extends to the political sphere as well. In his analysis of the voting
patterns of Hispanics in the 2012 presidential election, Steven Malanga of the Manhattan
Institute argues that, “the media’s emphasis on race and ethnicity are wrong,” and that,
“What’s more likely than race to account for Hispanic voting trends is income”
(Malanga, 2012).
Second, I would argue that future risk communication message campaigns should
be area-specific, and rely more on socioeconomic data than on the racial composition of
the target population to construct the specific communication model. Deemphasizing the
role of race may, in fact, simplify the development of more effective campaigns, because
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it allows a clearer picture of the risk communication process to emerge. It suggests that
the allocation of resources for future risk messaging campaigns can be structured
according to quantifiable principles, consistent with the goal of risk communication
researchers for the last several decades. It would also allow for more effective utilization
of proven communication models such as the Heuristic Systematic Model (“HSM”),
since it allows for the direct application of quantifiable communication elements.
Third, I would emphasize that of the three primary groups of sources of risk
communication messages researched (mass media, Internet-based communications, and
people), the respondents expressed the greatest amount of trust in mass media. This is
good news for the creators of risk message campaigns, for mass media outlets are likely
the most easily manageable of the available communication options.
I believe this study suggests a new perspective on the role of race in risk
communication, one in which race is considered as one of many identifying demographic
characteristics of a population, rather than as a determinant of its action. Regardless of
race, we will all be subject to the increasing vagaries of an overheated planet. It is our
responsibility as risk communication scholars to contribute to the development of
theoretical models that may serve to lessen, if not prevent, at least some of the damage
that is sure to occur from the increasing intensity of natural disasters.
The limitations of this study are likely apparent to the reader, as are the possible
suggestions for further research. First, as is said by residents and visitors alike, New
Orleans is a city like no other. This study is representative of the opinions of the
population of Orleans Parish on their sources of “information on dangerous
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environmental events, such as a hurricane or flood, which could threaten you or your
community” (see Appendix 1, “Telephone Survey Questions).” The answers would likely
have been different had they been about other types of risk messages, e.g., health risks. It
was conducted in the summer of 2012, almost seven years after Hurricane Katrina made
landfall. I believe it accurately represents the opinions of the residents of Orleans Parish
at that time about risk communication regarding natural disasters, a belief that is
supported by the results, which fall within a 95% confidence interval, with a margin of
error of 4.8%. But due to the unique nature of the city and its history, both social and
environmental, I make no claim to generalizability, and in fact would advise against it.
However, I do believe the survey method employed in this study, following closely the
work of previous researchers over the last twenty years or so, can be readily adapted to fit
the particular requirements of other communities to be studied.
Second, the topics of the two research questions – race and class – are
intentionally broad, and therefore the findings are similarly broad in scope. In like
fashion, the sources of risk communication were explored as categories, e.g., newspapers,
radio news, local TV news, social media sites, and therefore lack specificity. It is
reasonable to expect that if the survey questions were made more specific to the local
region, e.g., The Times-Picayune newspaper, Mayor Mitch Landrieu, and President
Obama, the answers would likely be different. The results yielded information valuable in
the broad scope, but perhaps difficult to apply to a certain medium or source. And in
similar fashion, if the questions were directed to an area of risk communication different
than natural disaster, e.g., health risks, the answers would likely be different. And
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although this study suggests that the Heuristic Systematic Model is the preferred vehicle
for the development of future risk messaging campaigns, the broad scope of the research
questions and the resultant findings, taken with the limitations of budget and time, does
not lend itself to the development of a site-specific communications model.
Also, with the reach and penetration of social media expanding exponentially
throughout the world, the use of sites such as Facebook and Twitter as media for the
communication of risk messages certainly deserves further exploration. The role that
social media sites played in the real-time transmission of information about Hurricane
Sandy serves as an example of their effectiveness as an effective vehicle for risk
communication.
I believe this study represents an important contribution to the risk
communication field, as it sheds new light on the role of race of race and class on the risk
messaging process, regardless of the platform the message creators choose to utilize to
transport those messages. It is my sincere hope that this study will help persuade future
researchers to look beyond the limits of race in their search for answers to future risk
communication challenges.
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Appendix 1
Telephone Survey Questions
C: General Perception Survey 2011
OPNENTER ON
COL 31
NOTE CTRLN
REVIEW PGUP
RETURN PGDN
QUITBTN ON
SQN ON
CATI OFF
BEEP ON
TIMSCAL .01 .1
MACRO DKNA
IF (ANS < 1)
IF (ANS > -8)
BEEP
REASK
ENDIF
ENDIF
ENDMACRO
Q: Hello
T: 2 5
Hello, my name is ____________ and I'm calling from Louisiana State
University' Public Policy Research Lab.
We are conducting a research study for Syracuse University.
PRESS 1 TO CONTINUE
I:
KEY 1
QAL THANKYOU
Q: Hello1
T: 5 5
We are interested in the sources that you can use to get information
on dangerous environmental events, such as a hurricane or flood,
which could threaten you or your community. The purpose of the study
is to find out what sources people use to get what is
called "risk information."
Our goal is to help develop better warning messages for future
environmental disasters.
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This is not a sales call. We are only interested in learning about
sources
of risk information. Results of the study will be published by
Syracuse University.
The questions will take approximately 15 minutes.
Would you be willing to answer some questions about risk
information?
1.Yes
2.No
I:
NUM 1 2
IF (ANS = 2) SKP THANKS

Q: AGE
T: 5 5
Are you 18 years of age or older?
1.Yes
2.No
I:
NUM 1 2
IF (ANS = 2) SKP THANKS

Q: LIVE
T: 5 5
Do you live in Orleans Parish?
1.Yes
2.No
I:
NUM 1 2
IF (ANS = 2) SKP THANKS
Q: HHLD
T: 5 5
Are you the head of the household?
1.Yes
2.No (Refuse)
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I:
NUM 1 2
IF (ANS = 2) SKP THANKS
Q: CNSNT
T: 5 5
Involvement in this study is voluntary, and you may refuse to take
part
in the research or withdraw at any time without penalty by simply
ending the call. Please feel free to ask questions about the
research
if you have any. I will be happy to explain or repeat anything
I have said. You will be asked to rate 13 potential sources of
risk information, which will take approximately 15 minutes of your
time.
All information will be kept anonymous.
If you have any questions, concerns, complaints about the research,
I will be happy to give you
the names and phone numbers of the people at Syracuse University and
Louisiana
State University who are responsible for this study. Just tell me at
any time during this phone
call that you want that information and I will give it to you. Are
you willing to take the survey?
1.Yes
2.No
I:
NUM 1 2
IF (ANS = 2) SKP THANKS

Q: INTRO
T: 5 5
There are a variety of sources that you can use to get
information on dangerous environmental events, such as
a hurricane or flood, which could threaten you or your
community. I’m going to name eight possible sources of
such information, and ask you to rate each of them on
four qualities,
using a scale of one to five, with one being the least and
five being the most. Are you ready to begin?
1.Yes
2.No
I:
NUM 1 2
IF (ANS = 2) SKP THANKS
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Q: Q1
T: 5 5
You can get information on dangerous environmental events from
news organizations.
Considering what you know, please tell me..
I. Local Newspapers - print or online
How would you rate local newspapers, either print or online,
where 1 means ‘inaccurate’ and 5 means ‘accurate’?
1. Inaccurate
2.
3.
4.
5. Accurate
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q2
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘unfair’ and 5 means ‘fair’?
1. Unfair
2.
3.
4.
5. Fair
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q3
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘Don’t tell the whole story’ and 5 means
’Tell the whole story’?
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1. Don’t tell the whole story
2.
3.
4.
5. Tell the whole story
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q4
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘are biased’ and 5 means ‘are unbiased’?
1. Are biased
2.
3.
4.
5. Are unbiased
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q5
T: 5 5
Now I’d like to ask you the same questions, but this time for radio
news.
II. Radio news
How would you rate radio news, where 1 means ‘inaccurate’
and 5 means ‘accurate’?
1. Inaccurate
2.
3.
4.
5. Accurate
-8. Don't Know
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-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q6
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘unfair’ and 5 means ‘fair’?
1. Unfair
2.
3.
4.
5. Fair
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q7
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘Doesn’t tell the whole story’ and
5 means ‘Tells the whole story’?
1. Doesn’t tell the whole story
2.
3.
4.
5. Tells the whole story
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q8
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘is biased’ and 5 means ’is unbiased’?
1. Is biased
2.
3.
4.
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5. Is unbiased
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q9
T: 5 5
III. Local television news
You can get information on dangerous environmental events from local
television news. Considering what you know, please tell me
How would you rate local television news, where 1 means ‘inaccurate’
and 5 means ‘accurate’?
1. Inaccurate
2.
3.
4.
5. Accurate
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q10
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘unfair’ and 5 means ‘fair’?
1. Unfair
2.
3.
4.
5. Fair
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
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DKNA
Q: Q11
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘Don’t tell the whole story’ and 5 means
’Tell the whole story’?
1. Doesn’t tell the whole story
2.
3.
4.
5. Tells the whole story
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q12
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘is biased’ and 5 means ‘is unbiased’?
1. Is biased
2.
3.
4.
5. Is unbiased
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q13
T: 5 5
In today’s world, there are new ways to get information on
dangerous environmental events, including visiting websites other
than news sites, or by accessing social media sites
such as Facebook and Twitter. I’m going to ask you to rate each
of those sources on four qualities, using a scale of one to five,
with one being the least and five being the most.
IV. Web sites other than news sites
Considering what you know, please tell me
How would you rate web sites other than news sites,
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where 1 means ‘inaccurate’ and 5 means ‘accurate’?
1. Inaccurate
2.
3.
4.
5. Accurate
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q14
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘unfair’ and 5 means ‘fair’?
1. Unfair
2.
3.
4.
5. Fair
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q15
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘Don’t tell the whole story’ and 5 means
’Tell the whole story’?
1. Don’t tell the whole story
2.
3.
4.
5. Tell the whole story
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
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Q: Q16
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘are biased’ and 5 means ‘are unbiased’?
1. Are biased
2.
3.
4.
5. Are unbiased
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q17
T: 5 5
V. Social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter]
Now I’d like to ask you the same questions, but this time for
social media sites, such as Facebook or Twitter.
Considering what you know, please tell me
How would you rate social media sites,
where 1 means ‘inaccurate’ and 5 means ‘accurate’?
1. Inaccurate
2.
3.
4.
5. Accurate
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q18
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘unfair’ and 5 means ‘fair’?
1. Unfair
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2.
3.
4.
5. Fair
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q19
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘Don’t tell the whole story’ and 5 means
’Tell the whole story’?
1. Don’t tell the whole story
2.
3.
4.
5. Tell the whole story
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q20
T: 5 5
How would you rate social media sites,
Where 1 means ‘are biased’ and 5 means ‘are unbiased’?
1. Are biased
2.
3.
4.
5. Are unbiased
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA

120

Q: Q21
T: 5 5
People are also a source of information on dangerous environmental
events. I’m going to name three possible groups of people,
and ask you to rate each of them on four qualities,
using a scale of one to five, with one being the least and
five being the most. Considering what you know, please tell me.
VI. National leaders and spokespersons
How would you rate national leaders and spokespersons,
where 1 means ‘inaccurate’ and 5 means ‘accurate’?
1. Inaccurate
2.
3.
4.
5. Accurate
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q22
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘unfair’ and 5 means ‘fair’?
1. Unfair
2.
3.
4.
5. Fair
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q23
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘Don’t tell the whole story’ and 5 means
’Tell the whole story’?
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1. Don’t tell the whole story
2.
3.
4.
5. Tell the whole story
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q24
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘are biased’ and 5 means ‘are unbiased’?
1. Are biased
2.
3.
4.
5. Are unbiased
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q25
T: 5 5
VII. Local community leaders and spokesperson
Now I’d like to ask you the same questions, but this time for
local community leaders and spokespersons.
How would you rate local community leaders and spokespersons,
where 1 means ‘inaccurate’ and 5 means ‘accurate’?
1. Inaccurate
2.
3.
4.
5. Accurate
-8. Don't Know
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-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q26
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘unfair’ and 5 means ‘fair’?
1. Unfair
2.
3.
4.
5. Fair
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q27
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘Don’t tell the whole story’ and 5 means
’Tell the whole story’?
1. Don’t tell the whole story
2.
3.
4.
5. Tell the whole story
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q28
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘are biased’ and 5 means ‘are unbiased’?
1. Are biased
2.
3.
4.
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5. Are unbiased
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q29
T: 5 5
VIII. Family and Friends
Now I’d like to ask you the same questions, but this time for
family and friends.
How would you rate family and friends,
where 1 means ‘inaccurate’ and 5 means ‘accurate’?
1. Inaccurate
2.
3.
4.
5. Accurate
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q30
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘unfair’ and 5 means ‘fair’?
1. Unfair
2.
3.
4.
5. Fair
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
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NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q31
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘don’t tell the whole story’ and 5 means
tell the whole story’?
1. Don’t tell the whole story
2.
3.
4.
5. Tell the whole story
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q32
T: 5 5
Where 1 means ‘are biased’ and 5 means ‘are unbiased’?
1. Are biased
2.
3.
4.
5. Are unbiased
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q33
T: 5 5
How often do you use the following as sources of information,
where 1 means ‘not at all’ and 5 means ‘a lot’?
Newspapers, either print or online
1. Not at all
2.
3.
4.
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5. A lot
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q34
T: 5 5
Radio news
1. Not at all
2.
3.
4.
5. A lot
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q35
T: 5 5
Local television news
1. Not at all
2.
3.
4.
5. A lot
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q36
T: 5 5
Web sites other than news sites
1. Not at all
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2.
3.
4.
5. A lot
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA
Q: Q37
T: 5 5
Social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter
1. Not at all
2.
3.
4.
5. A lot
-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA

Q: QF1
T: 5 5
In conclusion, I have five short questions about you and
your family. Any and all information you provide is
completely anonymous.
What is your age?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

18 - 24 years
25- 34 years
35 - 44 years
45 - 64 years
65 and over

-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
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I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA

Q: QF2
T: 5 5
Gender
[INTERVIEWER: please record gender]
1.Male
2.Female
I:
NUM 1 2
Q: QF3
T: 5 5
Household Income
What is your approximate household income before taxes?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Less than $10,000
$10,000 - $21,999
$22,000 - $34,999
$35,000 - $49,999
$50,000 - $74,999
$75,000 - $99,999
$100,000 or more

-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 7
DKNA
Q: QF4
T: 5 5
Education
What is the highest grade or year of school you have completed?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Elementary (0-8)
Some high school (1 to 3 years)
High school graduate (4 years)
Some college (1 to 3 years)
College graduate ( 4 or more years)
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-8. Don't Know
-9. Refused
I:
NUM -9 5
DKNA

Q: QF5
T: 5 5
Race
Which of the following best describes your racial or
ethnic background?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Asian
Black or African American
White/Caucasian
Hispanic
Native American
Some other race alone
Two or more races
Other

-8. Don't Know
-9. Not Sure/ Refused
I:
NUM -9 8
DISPOS = 20
CPL

Q: THANKYOU
T: 5 5
That is the end of the survey. On behalf of Syracuse University,
I'd like to thank you for participating.
PRESS G TO END THE SURVEY
I:
KEY G
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ENDQUEST
Q: THANKS
T: 5 5
Thank you for your time.
PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE
I:
KEY
ENDQUEST

Have a good day.
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Appendix 2
Description of Survey Methodology
New Orleans Media Survey
Data Collection: Data were conducted, via telephone interviews, from June 18 through July 24
by trained interviewers in the facilities of the Public Policy Research Lab. Calls were
conducted from noon until 9:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on
Saturday and noon to 8:00 p.m. on Sunday. Telephone numbers were selected using random
digit dialing. Numbers where callers received no answer were called 10 times before being
removed from the pool of eligible numbers. When possible, a message was left briefly
describing the survey along with a toll free number for the Public Policy Research Lab.
Three attempts at refusal conversion were made no sooner than 72 hours after the initial
refusal.
The survey includes a traditional landline telephone survey combined with a survey of
Louisiana cell phone users. Current estimates place the percent of cell phone only
households at approximately 34 percent at the national level.1 Reliable local estimates are
harder to find but we do know that cell only households are more common in urban areas,
among ethnic and racial minorities, and among younger adults. In addition to the cell only
population there is a cell mostly population comprised of individuals who still have a
landline telephone but rely almost exclusively on their cell phones for calls. Current estimates
place the wireless mostly population at 16 percent of all households (and 29 percent of
households with both a cell phone and a landline phone.
The National Health Interview Survey, a national in-person health survey, provides the most reliable and upto-date estimates of cell only households. Wireless substitution reports can be found here:
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhis.htm
1
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All respondents included in the final results – cell phone and landline - are randomly
selected. The final data set includes 414 respondents including 136 respondents interviewed
on their cell phones and 278 respondents interviewed on landline telephones. The overall
margin of error for the survey is +/- 4.8 percentage points at a 95% confidence interval,
meaning that if we replicated this survey 20 times only once would the results differ by more
than 4.8 points relative to the answers given in this report. Other types of errors can also
affect survey results, including question wording, question order, and errors in the
interviewing process.
The response rate for the landline telephone survey is 21 percent, meaning that 21 percent of
calls to eligible households resulted in a completed interview. The response rate for the cell
phone survey is 7.1 percent. Response rates are computed using formula # 3 from the
American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR). The cooperation rate for the
landline telephone survey is 27 percent, meaning that 27 percent of calls in which a potential
respondent was contacted yielded a completed interview. The cooperation rate for the cell
phone survey is 14 percent. Differences in response rates among different segments of the
population may result in biased estimates of public opinion. To account for these
differences, data were often weighted by demographic characteristics where sample estimates
do not closely mirror census-based population estimates.
Weighting: Data are weighted using a raking procedure in STATA to match 2010 census
population estimates for age, education, income, race, and gender for Orleans Parish.
Because respondents are often reluctant to provide information related to personal income,
missing values for the income variable were imputed based on respondent education, age,
race, and gender. This imputed income variable was used to create the data weights and is
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available in the data set for analysis. Table V presents the unweighted, weighted, and census
estimates for selected demographic variables.
Table V: Unweighted, Weighted and Census Estimates for Selected Demographics.

Gender
Male
Female
Race
White/Caucasian
Black/African-American
Other
Education
Less than High School
High School
Some College
College
Age
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-64
65 and over
Income
Less than $10,000
$10,000 - $34,999
$35,000 - $49,999
$50,000 - $74,999
$75,000 - $99,999
$100,000 or more

Unweighted

Weighted

Census

31.9%
68.1%

48.5%
51.5%

48.6%
51.4%

34.7%
57.1%
8.2%

36.7%
54.6%
8.7%

33.0%
60.2%
6.8%

6.9%

14.7%

16.6%

19.3%
28.9%
45.0%

24.2%
26.3%
34.9%

26.9%
24.9%
31.6%

2.7%
11.9%
12.6%
41.0%
31.9%

12.8%
20.0%
17.6%
34.5%
15.2%

16.0%
19.0%
16.7%
34.0%
14.3%

12.6%
33.8%
15.2%
18.1%
7.5%
12.8%

9.8%
36.4%
14.8%
13.8%
9.0%
16.3%

13.9%
33.6%
13.5%
15.3%
8.5%
15.2%
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